A Temporal Order of Things:

Husserl's 'temporal objects' and Stiegler's critique of the (industrial) temporalisation of consciousness.[1]

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Abstract

In this paper I will examine Husserl's notion of a temporal object. It will entail both the role of temporal objects in the constitution of the consciousness and its effective study by Bernard Stiegler as a temporal industrialisation of the consciousness. Edmund Husserl coined the term 'a temporal object' in order to show that 'the object of inquiry' (the intention of the consciousness directed towards objects of the world) is a temporal state of the investigation itself. This temporal state creates the condition for the existence of a temporal object, which gives the 'striking evidence'. The consciousness is the intention of the subject; the temporal object is the intentionality of the world. This idea is developed by Bernard Stiegler, who applies the notion of temporal objects to his critique of the technical "industrial temporalisation of the consciousness under the pressure of hyper-industrialisation". [2]

In this process a problem of a fatal separation between the object and the subject is created and continues to influence contemporary thought in relation to technics and memory. Husserl was aware of this as the separation between Being and Lebenswelt(Life-World). Stiegler continues this line of the critique

of the division of 'technics' and 'trans-individuation' that connects the Husserlian phenomenology of temporal objects with the theory of 'organology' of Bernard Stiegler, which consists of the critical study of industrial temporalisation of consciousness. I will also show how as the result of the separation a temporal object is exteriorized and the thought becomes an image of the exterior.

1. Introduction

My main focus is on the concept of 'a temporal object' coined by Edmund Husserl and its complex development in the philosophy of technology or the theory of 'organology' by the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler as the question of the 'temporalisation of consciousness'.[3] This provides the need to understand the question of temporal objects and the dependence of memory on technologies. [4]A philosophical argument of the temporal object in this process constantly provides "a parallax view" that returns subjects to a starting point from another perspective. [5]This perspective is not the point of origins but the point of the remainder of the partial and temporal nature of the world itself. Named as a "montage- consciousness" by Bernard Stiegler, this perspective becomes more and more the horizon of the contemporary existence that consists of quickly appearing and disappearing objects. Arguably things do not simply appear and disappear and they become internalised by subjects without being aware of this internalisation.

2. Edmund Husserl: A Temporal Object

Husserl coined the term 'a temporal object' in order to show that the object of inquiry, the intention of the consciousness directed towards objects of the world, is a temporal state of the investigation itself. This temporal state creates the condition for the existence of a temporal object, which gives the 'striking

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evidence'. A temporal object means that the object is not only in time, but it is constituted through time and its flux coincides with the flux of consciousness. [6]A temporal object plays the role in the constitution of the subject, since it is an object towards which the consciousness is directed. The temporal object is the part of the content, which it translates (this content is the world). The consciousness is also a part of the content, but there is a difference: the temporal object perceived as a result of the intention may be developed by the consciousness differently: the consciousness may accept this object but also may reject it. In both cases the 'consciousness' performs the evidence, whereas the temporal object makes evidence available. The consciousness is the intention of the subject; the temporal object is the intentionality of the world. The subject takes intentionality from the object, as the trace of the world, in some cases putting it in brackets, when the trace doesn't explain the phenomena, whereas in other cases opening brackets. Temporal objects remain as such after being grasped too, again because of the difference. For example, in the arithmetic operation of dividing a smaller number to a bigger one, the subtracted number is memorised to be added later. It shows that being in time is the same as holding something in memory that will be re- membered later.[7]

3. A temporal object through prisms of Bernard Stiegler's critique of the temporal industrialisation of consciousness

Stiegler applied the notion of a temporal object to his critique of the technical "industrial temporalisation of the consciousness under the pressure of hyper-industrialisation". I would like to insist that in this process the problem of a fatal separation between the object and the subject is created and continues to influence the contemporary thought in relation to technics and memory. It raises the question of the *distinction*, which is initially enclosed within this separation .[8] Husserl was aware of this as the separation between Being and the life-world

(Lebenswelt*)* and Stiegler continues this line of critique of the division of 'technics' and 'trans-individuation'. [9]

Bernard Stiegler statesthat there is 'technics' that comes before the thought. Technics is thebeginning of any formation that provides the possibility of thought and it is the ability to see that makes it possible to think and to ask questions. It provides a very interesting account of technics as the human. We are technics that produce technics. In order to catch up with our technics we need to intensify our own technicity and to improve. The mechanism that provides the possibility to think about the technique is memory. Like in primary societies, memorising gestures improved primates to the degree of "bipedality", in our age of programming this question returns again. It is because technology has become the external memory and the fragmentation of consciousness by temporality motivates the partiality and a temporal industrialisation of consciousness. Because memory   now is 'a recorded memory' in other words,   the past is stored in technics, any question of remembering and forgetting is resided within the 'technics'. As he puts it, "retention is always already protention":

One memorizes only by forgetting, by effacing, by selecting what deserves to be retained from all that could have been retained; in the same vein, one memorizes only by anticipating, positively or negatively, that which could have happened (which means that retention is always already protention). [10]

The "now" resides in between the retrieval of the past and the anticipation of the future. The present is objectified as the recorded memory, it is retrievable and the meaning is already separated from the subject, it is in the world and it precedes the present. The source of the meaning may be found outside in the exterior world. The meaning may be retrieved from the past or from the recorded memory and passed to the future. "Technics" is the term that brings together the triad of technique, technicity and technology. [11] Any act of

remembering creates a return to a primal impulse and as a result of returns and retrievals memory is disseminated elsewhere in history of culture.[12] Following Derrida, Stiegler believes that any dissemination provides the way towards the deconstruction of a primary impulse and the return to a primal impulse is a constant elaboration of disseminated memory in repetition and difference. On the one hand the return intensifies the possibility of remembering. On the one hand the return intensifies the possibility of remembering. On the other hand, it makes forgetting possible. In this way or another, relying on technologies for reasons of memory substitutes our own technique, a primary technique that comes before thought. Joined together technics and thinking are constantly discovering a mechanism to constitute the subject.

The constitution of the subject is taking place at the discovery of a mechanism and the mechanism is what brings together technics and thinking. The mechanism (memory) is linking together technics and thought. Since the link between the technics and thought may be broken and joined again the mechanism is articulated in time and as such it is manifested in a temporal object. A temporal object that links and relinks while trying to grasp configurations of time imprinted in technics and thought. As it was shown by Husserl through his notion of intentionality an object comes before the consciousness. It is a temporal object towards which the consciousness is directed. In other words, consciousness is directed *backwards* to the temporal object which comes before. It is followed by retentions. In order demonstrate the role retention plays in memory he gives an example of listening to the music on the gramophone. He specifies two retentions; the first retention is coming across the melody and the second time is remembering what is heard before, that forms the' image-consciousness'. Stiegler reconsiders the third retention, a technology itself that is a gramophone, as a "tertiary memory": the gramophone qua tertiary memory originally highlights the fact of the selection of primary

retention by consciousness. The third retention is the technique or the recorded memory to which it is always possible to return: for example to watch a film, which is a memory of something. A favourite record is an embodiment of a favourite song etc. The 'selection' provides and intensifies the return to the primal impulse. Perception-consciousness-selection triad is equal to –technique-technicity-technology triad. A temporal object in its turn provides a parallax view, which returns subjects to a starting point from another perspective and this helps to understand temporal objects as temporal but also not completely understood and therefore enclosed, an isomorphic subject.

This third retention is associated with a technical object, external to any internal consciousness. The technical object also assists subjects to retain the lost memory. In order to get this assistance subjects need to gain the awareness of this object. Technical objects are temporal, in this sense, by their being temporally enclosed until their essential function is understood. A temporal object is what confronts the time in flux. The consciousness confronts the temporal object and the 'ontological cut' or 'the montage' takes place and consciousness dwells in this temporal until becoming the habit. After the habituation,   to return to the beginning, where the 'ontological cut' became possible by memory only and memory itself is formed by the primary impression, retention and protention. It is how the subject or the 'retentional finitude'   behaves while facing the technology: time (a temporal object) and consciousness are intertwined. At this point of coinciding consciousness with the temporal object something forgotten is re-membered. The consciousness starts to become familiar with this object and it continues until this process forms a habit. This double articulation is the key to the possibility for understanding both creative and critical approaches. The conjecture of technics forming the habit is the point that produces the effect of pharmacy. This effect is also the constitutive element of the formation   of 'places of memory'.[13] It is

because from the moment of forming the habit another procedure, a '*ruckfragen*', the reverse inquiry or 'back to things themselves' starts. This is opening - up the horizon of the new formation of trans-individuation. For the purpose of understanding that these objects are temporal until they become a habit while existing through time, I introduce here the notion of the 'enclosed': temporal-enclosed objects.[14] Objects are enclosed until the consciousness is intended towards them and they become open as soon as they are grasped. This double activity is residing in the object as well as it is being characteristic for the consciousness. A temporal object (time) and the intentional object (consciousness) coincide.

Tertiary retention is a double retention: it is temporal and it is enclosed at the same time. The evidence provided by the temporal object is the basis to which to return, since the trace of the world is residing at the point of the intention and therefore the consciousness is not a final state of being. To remember means going back to the temporal object and back to the consciousness again until, albeit temporarily, a certain understanding takes place. 'To understand something' means to start a new inquiry and to retrieve intentional objects again and again. Husserl claimed that 'temporal objects' are objects that neither existing nor non-existing. For Husserl there is a difference between retention and reproduction includes that reproduction understood in the Kantian sense of reproductive imagination ends in representation, whereas retention provides a distinction and a stream of consciousness, it may or may not be interrupted. Representation opens- up the possibility to interpret, retention leads to the interruption, which is an event in –itself and not the "slightest use of conclusion".[15] The "bracketing" is resided in between the interruption and the event. Time is fixed, yet time flows. The now is continuous moment of individuation. The now is a relative concept and refers to a 'past', just as 'past' refers to the 'now'. [16] The time is now is a new-time point and a new-object

point. Retention is different from reproduction in the sense that it grasps the object of time. Therefore, the reproduction is different from the retention since reproduction produces representation whereas the retention is presenting of memory. However memory is present in both, reproduction and retention. Reproduction makes memory immanent whereas retention opens-up the way towards the transcendental. Nevertheless the immanent and transcendental experiences are connected in a remarkable way by a change in attitude; we can pass from the one to other.[17]They are treated by presentations as existing relative to some framework, while the question of their real or absolute existence remains "bracketed". It is evident in Husserl's claim of "temporal objects come to be constituted in acts constituting the very differences belonging to time". [18] For Stiegler all the differences are technics and temporary objects further re- formed by the technology. The third retention, however, is not reductive but constitutive of the primary retention. The secondary retention by Husserl is called 'image-consciousness', but Stiegler insists that consciousness is impossible without the technics that is a primary source of retention and memory and therefore it is formed as the 'recorded memory'. What is very crucial to this process is the temporary nature of recording itself. Besides, it shows that no origin of memory and consequently knowledge is possible and instead there is a beginning, an intention that opens-up the possibility by providing a terrain of knowing by remembering and learning from temporal objects that contains the 'recorded memory'. Memory is not visible. If it was visible then there would be no problem with memory. Memory is hidden in codes: in dots and dashes of the information. Sometimes it becomes visible as texts, paintings, films that are traces of memory. These traces may be representations and representations do not contain any truth. But they are real objects in their way of constitution the subject. They may be very useful in reconstruction of the consciousness, but they don't construct any identity. It shows that the essence is also impossible and the return to a temporal object

helps to discover not essences but traces recorded in objects. One needs to trace traces and study codes of the recorded memory. Therefore any representation is an indication to study, otherwise it exhibits an illusion. Images become truthful when they work as a parallax view and return subjects to the beginning by different means. Therefore the evidence should be traced in a parallax view. This view includes the relationship between the internal and the external. The internal and the external may be connected by thought, which is extended from the intention of consciousness towards *back* to a temporal object.

4. The Thought as the Other (The Image of the Exterior)

The thought contains the thing perceived and further the thought can transcend itself by thinking itself (cogitatum *qua cogitatum*). It reduces its content by returning 'back to things themselves', actually to the point where the thing is received by the thought. The power of thinking is in its effect of connecting. The connectivity itself is possible with the point of the contact with the thing, which is distanced from its origin. The question of connectivity includes the discovery of the point of loss, rather than the initial starting point. The activity of thinking connects the consciousness with temporal objects. These objects are proliferated due to the different approaches taken by the direction of the thought. The starting point is lost forever and this loss is recorded by technics. The horizon of ownness is replaced by the horizon of subjectivity as the place of dissemination of temporal objects. To connect with a temporal object means to connect with the technics. The act of connecting in the horizon of the subjectivity independently alters the situation and at the same time the position of objects of time changes. These changes cannot be memorised any longer, since the capacity of memorising is limited. The loss provided by this process may only be grasped technologies of recording (from the alphabetic writing to

the SMS messaging) and brought back to subjects. In this case we are relying on the essence which is altered, which has become "otherwise than being". [19] It also provides the position of a temporal object as the beginning, which has no point of origin or clear-cut end, it is a point of loss recorded and therefore otherwise. Technology makes present what is absent and at the same time constitutes the act of alterity. It also changes habits and together with this a relation to everyday life. Through the changes made to *habitus* (acquired disposition) and alienated from one's own intention to grasp the world, one constantly faces altered essences.[20] No closure is possible any longer and yet the object remains as temporal-enclosed, as a manifestation of partiality and temporality of the mundane life.

At this point I would like to recall the question specified in the 5th Meditation of "*Cartesian Meditations*" by Husserl: What does the presence of the other in the horizon of my ownness alter in my habits? [21]. What the presence of the other alters in one's habit is the way of thinking. Habit needs to be understood here as the primal impression in its altered form that became memorised through exercises in everyday life. It is, in other words, the technique distinguished with its familiarity. But with the development of thought and its dissemination in cultural objects, thinking has also taken the form of the image alongside ideas. These cultural objects are the manifestation of memory, an external image of the world made accessible to everyone and potentially connects one with the other. Cultural objects are in fact, objects connecting the self with the other as a crucial fact of intersubjectivity as far as these objects are able to constitute the thinking subject. Husserl emphasizes that ego experience the other as already really existing in the world; as somebody who perceives the world. The ego also exists as a subject for this world.[22] The world perceived by the self is the world also perceived by the other and accessible for others. This constitutes the objectivity of the world which provides the possibility of intersubjectivity. All

the visible and invisible world consisting of cultural objects, a recorded memory is accessible to everyone:

…all cultural Objects (books, tools, works of any kind, and so forth), which moreover carry with them at the same time the experiential sense of thereness-for-everyone.[23]

But the question is that the existence of these objects creates even more complex questions of alterity and difference. This makes the question of subjectivity even more prominent. Cultural objects are also the main storage space of memory and therefore the place where thinking differently begins. It includes different forms of thinking across different cultures, which involves cultures not known until now. It is the beginning of the movement backwards to other cultures but also the movement forward since any discovery of the unknown culture opens up the perspective to re-new the way of thinking. The call for alterity itself is posed by the thought. The capacity which helps to form and develop the objective world *is an exteriorized image of the thought* connecting differences. *The thought is separated from its (thinking) subject* and a constant referring back creates a new and different picture. It helps to provide an account of the thought as the changing subject and its role played in 'grammatisiation'. *Since the thought is a temporal object, which exists through time as thinking it is memorised by being recorded in cultural objects(in a book or USB card or any other such object).*In other words, the technique of thinking may only be accessible in its recorded form, as a recorded memory. Grammatisation as a model is based on this kind of trans-individuation as different from Husserl's individual consciousness, while taking technics seriously as inseparable from the human. Approached from this angle, the question of 'solipsism' and its critique provides a conjectural space for the possibilities of trans-individuation and understanding of the world of cultural objects (technics)   as the world of differences created by the subjectivity of the thought itself. [24]

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A constant thinking occurs in time and provides the change and to exist through time means being constantly altered by thinking. It also means to transcend and to grasp endless phenomena in its reduction, while being recorded. *To reduce* means both to suspend and to provide the possibility of the reverse inquiry or to investigate backwards. This would connect the thing evident with the thing intended by the thought at the first place. Thinking connects the intention (memorised) with the evidence that is present: the essence is altered by the transcendence by leaving behind the phenomenal and the eidetic. In Husserl's words:

If even the world will go away, transcendental ego will still be there.[25]

In other words, remnants of the reduction, the rest of the time is what is altered by transcending and by becoming the other. Further there is the question of what is the otherness of the other: what is so other about the other? It is the other residing within the self and as the self comes to its limits the other becomes visible. This transcendental ego is present or enclosed within the temporality of the eidetic. Both are formed by thought. I perceive this encounter between the eidetic and transcendental and between the essential thought and the transcendental thought as a schema, schematising '*res cogitas*'. The separation between the '*cogito*' and '*res cogitas*', between the self and the other is the problem of disturbing the habit or the degree of habituation.[26]The question is not accepting or rejecting the other, but the question of what the presence of the other is altering in one's habit and how this alterity itself is affected by the separation between the object and the subject. Already in his early stage of developing phenomenology Husserl says:

Let us look at a piece of chalk. We close our eyes. We have two perceptions, but we say of them that we see the same chalk twice. We have, thereby, contents which are separated temporally. We can also see a phenomenological apartness (Ausgeinander), a separation, but there is no separation in the object. It is the same. In the object, there is duration, in the phenomenon, change"[27]

The altering of the habit occurs by the distinction. Like an example of the watching the film: *apartness* of the phenomena of watching from the temporal object, a film which *endures*, even though it is a fragment of time. The phenomenon is changing and together with it the thinking subject changes. The thinking subject splits in between the 'time-consciousness' and 'montage – consciousness'. The consciousness becomes industrialised by this separation. Because of the dissemination, the initial technique (the thought) seems to be absent. The thought is dissipated as the result of the proliferation of temporal objects, but in the analogical manner it may be brought back. What is complicated is that the thought is disseminated in these temporal objects. The thought is the other, and it is also a technique of making present. What is created for human and by human, namely, technology poses the question of not technology only but also the lost thought which is disseminated with the proliferation of technics.

5. Organology and techno-cultural phenomenology

Through the critique of 'a temporal object' of Husserl, Stiegler's work is a new approach to the work of philosophy of organology. [28] Because memory is now a recorded memory, technologies that record this memory constitute a new consciousness that may be called 'montage -consciousness' and this 'montage-consciousness' is the consciousness of a 'recorded memory'. The recorded memory is a discrete matter and contains many temporal objects. [29]The modern subject perceives the discreetness while relying on technologies that are themselves the record of temporal objects. This produces a pharmacy effect. On the one hand this temporalizes consciousness and provides an on-going industrialisation dangerously manipulating "available brain-time". [30] On the other hand the same process opens-up another possibility of assembling fragments and distracted bits, what Stiegler calls *"derushage"*. Borrowed from the language of the cinematic montage, 'derushage' or 'the first assembly'

(consisting of traces of memory of temporal objects) is a mechanism to constitute the subject and the constitution itself is possible due to the persistence of temporal objects. Because of the proliferation of temporal objects the difficulty of grasping the lost object is possible by articulating the thought in the mechanism of 'derushage' that may in that way or another increase the possibility of connecting .The widening gap between 'cogitas' and "cogitatum qua cogitatum" demands a new techno-phenomenological philosophy of organology to retain a "body without organs", that will make possible "immanent and transcendental experience (…) to be connected by distinguishing 'a change in attitude" . [31]

Stiegler's work includes the assertion that there is always the other and because of this the temporal object becomes accessible to consciousness. The question remains is the question of accepting this possibility in order to understand. Temporality of the object is crucial to understanding time in general, which is emerging with the intention of the consciousness towards the object. The object is already corresponds to something closed "there":

To every object there correspond ideally closed systems *of truth* that are true of it.[32]*(italics are mine)*

In other words,   there should be an intention directed towards objects, otherwise they are not open, they are enclosed and the intention to understand them helps to turn objects into one's own repertoire. In a simple example, when we buy a new computer we can personalise the system, but if one doesn't know about it the computer may be not very useful. It is also true in terms of films: in order to understand films we may be actively reconstructing images we see, but also simply remain passive or 'upset-minded' as it was once described by Walter Benjamin and to leave the cinema ignorantly, although alterity still occurs but without transformation.[33] It means that technology doesn't simply solve problems for us, but it creates a specific context with the possible

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meaning, a temporal-enclosed object,   which may be deconstructed for individual purposes, which is also the important point of 'individuation'.

The absence of the thought is felt also because the technique which precedes the thought is translated into technologies by being recorded. The world is *not* simply an object and a thought- construction, but the world *appears* to us as the thought- construction. This thought- construction is the technics that constitutes the subject. One needs to grasp it by thinking further. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to put it according to the difference: *thought is the distinction which is constructed into further distinctions.* Things appear to subjects as temporal objects, in other words as 'thought-constructions' that are constructed by technics (by preceding the thought, but not excluding the technique of grasping by thinking) and may be deconstructed to be rediscovered in the following thought etc. It is also the constitution by construction, the possibility to overcome what is already known. In order that these thought- constructions, externalised by technics, become knowledgeable there is a need to develop a mechanism. *Derushage* is the first step made towards the reconstruction of thought-constructions followed by another step again and repeated until the subject is constituted. [34]This procedure of 'reduciere', a constant discovery proliferates and comes closer to completeness but never completed or determined. There is no '*pre*'- or '*over*'- determination, because temporalities cannot be simply defined by the pure rational means, yet it may be reduced to the infinite repetitions step-by -. Reduction in this repetitive process is reconstruction, in other words each repetition is grasping of the new thought. [35]

Reconstruction, like programming, takes place step- by- step. The inquiry into the object itself is the first step. In the current situation of the proliferation of objects to speak of a new object, that is a temporal-enclosed object is a necessity. The notion that objects made in one context lose their original meaning in another context and while rediscovered in another context they

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constantly obtain a new meaning and their function changes. They are temporal but after losing their original meaning (what temporarily resides inside objects) they still remain as temporary (meaningless)   objects. It is until the rediscovery of objects,   they remain enclosed and waiting to be taken into consideration again. The inquiry into the object opens - up of a perspective for a new function. This procedure of objects' temporality leads them (objects)   to receive their new function after the rediscovery. This is crucial to temporal-enclosed objects. The notion of temporal-enclosed objects manifests both the state of temporary nature and closeness (open-endedness)   of these objects: they are transcended into a new time -span after being understood and they are enclosed until being understood again in a new context.

Temporal objects constantly constitute contemporary consciousness because we are constantly being-in touch with technologies. This constantly 'being –in – touch' with technics is called by some 'trans-humanism', but it is normal state of affairs, achieved with the proliferation of technics. The use of the prefix 'trans' in the notion of the 'trans-humanism' indicates that any constitution of the subject is the matter of translation. As I already mentioned, the proliferation makes technology more mundane that was once distanced from the human imagination. Technologies are largely created as a result of the scientific and philosophical thinking has an interesting moment: if the science, philosophy and art create a distance from subjects, because of their complexity or as Husserl would say the 'mathematization' that is separated the thought from the Lebenswelt, then the everyday use of technologies made for the human use puts subjects back in touch with the products of science. When users explore technologies they are being –in- touch with the thought (intention) that initially made technologies possible. This is the way temporal objects are articulated in technical objects and while interacting with   technologies,   subjects are connected to this origin,   sometimes without even having any idea of this

connection. This connection creates the difference and technical objects as transcendental intentions translated back into the subject. The intentions of temporal objects are translated into the realm of everyday objects. *The intentional object is exteriorized and a temporal object has become the image of the exterior.*

The proliferation of temporal objects creates a panoramic vision of a constantly changing consciousness or it creates a' montage –consciousness', which accordingly creates not only temporal objects but also temporal subjects. The world appears to us as temporal objects and what we remember in detail we perceive as whole pictures, like a film that consists of the part that gives an impression of a whole stretched to the limits of the screen. Stiegler's 'organology' is bringing together these parts to build a possible whole picture that works as if the 'body without organs' combined together. The connection is possible by thinking where 'the thought' stands in a strict relation to the mechanism (memory).

The thought is the intention and exists through time. In the situation of the proliferation of technics, like in our times 'the return to things themselves' may be reformulated as the return to the thought which is formed by the technics. They are inseparable from each other. It is because the proliferation provides the space where thinking may take place as a temporal object. It may provide the possibility of the return, but here the return will be the return to the technology, which contains the temporal object, which is externalised anthem recorded memory. The initial thought may also be reconstructed as an image, or the sound or a graphic line. It is because the consciousness is industrialised by the proliferation of temporal objects and *the thought become an exterior image, the other, the intention of the world.*

Being reduced to 'recording' in this manner suspends the temporality (repetition) and de-temporalises time. Time flows but any activity of grasping this phenomenon of the flux de-temporalises it; for example counting '1, 2, 3…∞' records the act of counting, but not the flow itself and preservers the grasped time, 'a temporal object' to which one can always return. Another example is the 'indexing' used ubiquitously in new media: in the alphabetic ordering only the first letters are connected to each other, while the list itself may bring together randomly chosen words and then this 'order' may change again and may be re-recorded again. Recording temporalizes time itself and consciousness further constituted through the industrially recorded memory.

5. Conclusion

Husserl was one of the earliest philosophers to understand the role technology plays in the constitution of subject and the formation of 'time-consciousness' by temporal objects, although he didn't realise the significance of technical objects, which is criticised by Stiegler . Clearly associated with the everyday life this kind of formation provided the 'montage-consciousness' that is questioned in the work of Bernard Stiegler, who insists that since the contemporary consciousness is formed under the influence and out of 'bits' and 'pieces' like a newsreel in the news media, but also in the cinema, the philosophy of organology is the reconstruction according to constitutive possibilities of consciousness and it is a step towards the remedy against the ill-being produced by the same technologies.

Atemporal object exists as a transcendental reminder of the passing of the partiality that all forms of knowledge and technics are pointing to the difference, that all the sciences speak about the same thing in different languages. This difference provides the possibility for transcendence. It was

clear to Husserl. Stiegler's work on technics and time shows the striking evidence of it. [36]

By taking cinema as a technique that precedes sthought, Stiegler claims that cinema constitutes the 'time-consciousness' (Husserl) as 'montage-consciousness' while providing the pharmacy effect. Cinema is a synthesis of sense and understanding, which takes back to Kant through the cross-circulation of temporal objects. New media as it is influenced by the realistic effects of cinema as a poison and the remedy-'contributing available- brain-time unconsciously' leads to the oblivion. D*erushage* or being aware of the 'cut-n-mix' effects becomes a necessary condition of the constitution as experienced by temporal objects as far as they are thinkable and thinking here connects the intelligible with the sensible leading to the remembrance.

The notion that with the proliferation there is *a community of temporal objects* that needs to be understood. By taking its origins from Husserl's temporal objects and Derrida's differ*a*nce alongside with some other figures Stiegler provides basics of the 'organology' which I would like to call as a *cultural techno-phenomenology*. It is the study of the role a temporal object plays in the constitution of subjects, with the belief that like Aristotle's hypothesis on heavy objects tendency falling down gave rise to the modern physics, Stiegler's organology inevitably will open-up possibilities to learn new technics, at least what is connected to mnemo-technologies, that will work as a critique and a pleasure of encountering with the industry without marginalising the temporal object of philosophy, that is 'thought'. This will also pave the way to the "liberation of hypomnesic memory from its industrial function". [37]

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[1] This text is based on my talk given at the BSP conference on 13th of September 2017, which took place at Brighton University.

[2] I understand *hyper-industrialisation* as the state of the immersive form provided by new media perception of the world through digital infrastructures and other forms of communication provided by the on-going industrial revolutions.

[3] Organology is a theory of the articulation of bodily, artificial, and social organs. See Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery, Volume 2: The Catastrophe of the Sensible* , Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015

[4] It dates back to Plato's statement about the destruction of memory by technics of writing that replaced speech.

[5] 'Parallax view' is the term coined by Kojin Karatani in order to explain antinomies by Kant. See: Kojin Karatani, *Transcritique. On Kant and Marx,* MIT Press, 2003.

[6] I would like to point to the use of the concept of 'a temporal object' as originated from 'continues function' a concept coined by Karl Weierstrass. While studying mathematics with Weierstrass in 1878-1880 at University of Berlin, Husserl became interested in this concept. A continuous object is a geometric object (topos) which functions continuously in space, in a topological continuum. For Husserl this continuous function is 'now' or 'a temporal object', which is a continuous moment of individuation and constantly constitutes subjects.

[7] Clearly the metaphysical question of what numbers are and the epistemological question of 'how we know about them' were crucial to Husserl's investigations. Mathematics is everywhere and yet its objects are nowhere. There may be three apples on the window but the number three itself is not to be found in, on, beside or anywhere near the apples.

[8] Again the role played in the distinction by numbers is not alien to Husserl and Husserl himself called his project of the study of 'temporal objects', close to Hilbert's study of 'closeness'. On this subject see: Kusch, Martin, *Language as calculus vs. language as universal medium: a study in Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer*. Dordrecht Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989

[9] The question of the connection between being and sense lies in the division created between them and they are divided by the 'thought'. In other words the thought that creates an emotion in the poetry and the thought which creates the transcendence in mathematics are the difference between them. The thought makes the difference: in one context it creates the emotion and in the other the notion.

[10] Bernard Stiegler, Memory, *Critical terms for media studies*, (edited by W.J.T. Mitchell and Mark Hansen), The University of Chicago Press , 2010, pp.64-87

[11] This term is used by Stiegler following Gilbert Simondon. It should also be noted that the term 'technologies 'is a broad notion which might easily include 'temporal objects'; and

they mediate by playing a connecting role. See Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical*

Objects,https://www.academia.edu/4185570/Gilbert_Simondon_The_Essence_of_Technicity

[12] It should also be noted that memory produces both remembrance and oblivion.

[13] Pierre Nora quoted in Bernard Stiegler, Memory, *Critical terms for media studies*, (edited by W.J.T. Mitchell and Mark Hansen), The University of Chicago Press , 2010, pp.64-87

[14] Problematically referring to Heidegger's notion of 'the world as a closed whole or 'world-disclosure' *(Erschlossenheit),* I use temporal-enclosed in order to show that the resisting capacity of the subject which is resided in the 'thought' will necessarily be schematised in order to become a convention. But before it becomes the convention it needs to be properly become a technique or 'technics' and to avoid the artificial diminishing of the necessity of technics that leads to the thought, which is in itself may be a new program of the neo-Enlightenment based upon the new, critically revisited post-Adorno oriented cultural industry.

[15] Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time -Consciousness, Indiana University Press,1964, p.22

[16]Ibid,   p.22

[17] Ibid., p22

[18]Ibid p.22

[19]Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,* Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981

[20]*Habitus* in translation from Latin means the "acquired disposition".

[21] Edmund Husserl, Cartesian *Meditations*: *An Introduction to Phenomenology*, Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988, pp.89-157

[22] Ibid, p.91

[23] Ibid, 92

[24] With the development of technologies, there are many theories insisting that the affirmation of subjects in the objective world takes place not only in the act of thinking, but with all his/her senses. It is true, however, with the proliferation of technologies and their use by human's show that different senses may be simulated by technologies but they will still be operated by thought. I am not privileging thinking over other activities and senses, but referring to the historical fact of most of the senses being active because of their relation to thinking.

[25] Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy --* First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982.

[26] It is also a stage when phenomenology enters into a new relationship and the point of the misinterpretation of Husserl's thinking subject as an anthropological subject. Instead it is important to

understand that the other is implicit within the self   like in the arithmetic one number assumes another.

[27] Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time -Consciousness*, Indiana University Press, 1964, p.8

[28] Organology connects organic with the non-organic. The notion that there is an external memory which assists subjects and the exterior image is a non-organic extending the organic life which is in default. In Stiegler's words: "Organology is a theory and a practice of the organization that encompasses all kinds of non-technical realities. This theory, although 'general', does not claim to absorb all theories. But all theories are concerned by it, and I have the weakness to believe that it concerns them all – because it is a discourse on the conditions of possibility and on the limits of theories, which is also to say, on the necessity of practice". In "We have to become the quasi-cause of nothing - of nihil." An interview with Bernard Stiegler (2016), the interview by Daniel Ross with Bernard Stiegler. https://www.academia.edu/19784398/ 2016

[29] Digital objects may also be considered as temporal objects as far as they record 'a temporal object' by grasping it. Digital objects are recorders of temporal objects. If to think of Husserl's temporal object as a number, on the basis of the digital object there is a binary code. Yuk Hui points to this question in his text :What is a digital object?, Metaphilosophy, Volume 43, n 4, July 2012

[30] Available -brain- time' is the reference to the data created by the users of the internet and the internet providers' provocation to share knowledge.

[31] Husserl, Pure Phenomenology its method and its field of investigation, inaugural lecture at Freiburg, 1917, 1917, in Husserl: Shorter Works, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p.4

[32] Edmund Husserl, Pure Phenomenology its method and its field of investigation, inaugural lecture at Freiburg, 1917, 1917, in Husserl: *Shorter Works*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p.1

[33] Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in *Illuminations,* Schocken books, New York, 1978, p.217

[34] *Derushage* is the term used in Bernard Stiegler: *Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise.* tr. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 27

[35] Husserl uses the term '*ruckfragen'* in order show the importance of the reverse inquiry.

[36] The idea itself emerged within phenomenology in its most interesting form and in order to give some idea I would like to schematise it as follows in order only to point to this question: 're-productive-imagination' (Kant) versus retention (Husserl) and developed into a 'temporal industrialisation of consciousness' (Stiegler). Husserl challenges Kant: Husserl challenges Kant's notion of representation expressed in the "reproductive imagination"   in the First Critique. (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, St.Martins Press, New York, 1965) In The Phenomenology of Internal Time -Consciousness he shows, as it is mentioned above, already the difference between the representation and presentation. Heidegger, who shifts from 'subject-object' to the '*World-Dasein'*,

goes back to Kant's notion of schematism, while including the notion of representation into the phenomenological reduction. For him, philosophy is not the technique of grasping but the device of getting to the future in order to reach representation. Stiegler, who employs the notion of 'technics and time' via the work of Andre Leroi-Gourhan and Husserl and the time-based art of cinema, which is the invention of technology, shows that neither presentation, nor representation but a constant schematisation constitutes 'cinematic images' and therefore contemporary consciousness.

[37]Bernard Stiegler, Memory, *Critical terms for media studies*, (edited by W.J.T. Mitchell and Mark Hansen), The University of Chicago Press , 2010, pp.64-87