

A Temporal Order of Things: Temporal–enclosed objects

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“This invention, O king,” said Theuth, “will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have discovered.” But Thamus replied, “Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory.”¹

Bernard Stiegler argues that because memory now is ‘a recorded memory’ and any question of remembering and forgetting resides within the ‘technics’: the triad of technique, technicity and technology.² Any act of remembering creates a return to a primal impulse and as result of returns and retrievals memory (both remembrance and oblivion) is disseminated elsewhere in history of culture. Following Derrida, Stiegler believes that any dissemination provides the way towards the deconstruction of a primary impulse and the return to a primal impulse is a constant elaboration of disseminated memory in repetition and difference. The return intensifies the possibility of remembering. On the other hand, forgetting should also be taken into account. In this way or another, relying on technologies for reasons of memory substitutes our own

technique, a primary given that comes before thought.³ Joined together, technics and thinking are constantly discovering a mechanism (mechanism from ‘mecano’) to constitute the subject. The constitution of the subject is taking place at the discovery of a mechanism and the mechanism brings together technics and thinking. The mechanism is linking together technics and thought. Since the link between the technics and thought may be broken and joined again the mechanism is articulated in time and as such it is a temporal object. A temporal object that links and relinks while trying to grasp configurations of time imprinted in technics and thought. A temporal object means that the object is not only in time, but it is constituted through time and its flux coincides with the flux of consciousness. A temporal object plays the role in the constitution of the subject since it is an object towards which the consciousness is directed. The temporal object is the part of the content that it translates (this content is the world).⁴ The consciousness is also a part of the content, but there is a difference: the temporal object perceived as a result of the intention may be developed by the consciousness differently: the consciousness may accept this object but also may reject it. In both cases the ‘consciousness’ performs the evidence, whereas the temporal object makes evidence available. The consciousness is the intention of the subject; the temporal object is the intentionality of the world. The subject takes intentionality from the object, as the trace of the world, in some cases putting it in brackets, when the trace doesn’t explain the phenomena, whereas in other cases opening brackets. Edmund Husserl coined the term to describe the notion of ‘a temporal object’ in order to show that ‘the object of inquiry’ (the intention of the consciousness directed towards objects of the world) is a temporal state of the investigation itself. This temporal state creates the condition for the existence of a temporal object, which gives the ‘striking evidence’ (‘schlagender Evidenz’).⁵ Temporal objects remain as such after being grasped too, but there is a difference. For example, in the arithmetic operation of dividing a smaller number to a bigger

one, the subtracted number is memorised to be added later. It shows that being in time is the same as holding something in memory that will be re-remembered later.

Husserl states that an object comes before the consciousness and it is a temporal object towards which the consciousness is directed. In order to demonstrate the role retentions play in memory he gives an example of the listening to music on the gramophone.⁶ He specifies two retentions; the first retention is coming across the melody and the second time is remembering what is heard before, that forms the 'image-consciousness'. Bernard Stiegler reconsiders the third retention, a technology itself that is gramophone, as a "tertiary memory": the gramophone qua tertiary memory originally highlights the fact of the selection of primary retentions by consciousness.⁷

This third retention is also called a technical object, external to any internal consciousness, by Stiegler.⁸ He introduced the term to show that the third retention, the technology itself as a temporal object assists memory. I found that it is not sufficient to consider temporal objects and their role played in memory and a temporal object needs to be understood as an unfinished state and this unfinished state is in its being enclosed and therefore open to influences. I added to the term 'temporal' a notion of the enclosed: temporal-enclosed objects. Tertiary retention itself is a double retention: it is temporal and it is enclosed at the same time. The evidence provided by the temporal object is the basis to which to return, since the trace of the world is resided at the point of the intention and therefore the consciousness is not a final state of being and to remember means going back to the temporal object and back to the consciousness again until, albeit temporarily to understand. 'To understand something' means to start a new inquiry and to retrieve intentional objects again and again. In this sense temporal-enclosed objects are like Lacan's object *a* or Homi Bhabha's 'in-between', although neither Lacan nor Bhabha fully explain

what is a final role played in pointing to its constitution.⁹ Stiegler doesn't explain it either. Instead he elaborates on Husserl's temporary objects as completely formed by the technology. The third retention is not reductive but constitutive of the primary retention. The secondary retention by Husserl is called 'image-consciousness', but Stiegler insists that consciousness is impossible without the technics that is a primary source of retention and memory and therefore it is formed as the recorded memory. What is very crucial to this process is a temporary nature of recording itself and its being associative. Besides, it shows that no origin of memory and consequently knowledge is possible and instead there is a beginning, an intention that opens-up by providing a terrain of knowing by remembering and learning from temporal objects that contain recorded memory.

I realised that temporality of the object is crucial to understanding of time in general and to associations in a particular.¹⁰ Husserl himself uses the term in relation to temporal objects: 'internal-time consciousness' which is close to my own use. Temporal-enclosed objects are emerging with the intention of the consciousness towards the object. In other words there should be an intention directed towards objects, otherwise they are not open, they are enclosed and the intention to understand them helps to turn objects into one's own repertoire. In a simple example, when we buy a new computer we can personalise the system, but if one doesn't know about it the computer may be not very useful. It is also true in terms of films: in order to understand films we may be actively reconstructing them but also simply to stay passive and to leave the cinema ignorantly.¹¹ So technology doesn't simply solve problems for us, but it creates a specific context with the possible meaning, a temporal-enclosed object which may be deconstructed for individual purposes. Deconstruction, like programming, takes place step- by- step.

The inquiry into the object itself is the first step to deconstruction. In the current situation of the proliferation of images to speak of a new object, that is a temporal-enclosed object is a necessity. The notion that objects made in one context lose their original meaning in another context and while rediscovered in another context they obtain a new meaning and their function changes. They are temporal but after losing their original meaning (what temporarily resides inside objects) they still remain as objects. Until the rediscovery of objects, they remain enclosed and waiting to be taken into consideration again. The idea to re-consider an object opens- up a perspective for a new function. Like in Sol Lewitt's very sharp sentence: "The idea becomes a machine that makes art".¹² The idea is the intention, which constitutes the technique of how objects are conceived, but not how they are appearing. The intention is crucial in a way how objects are conceived, because to conceive means to develop further and it is a process. The intention is crucial in a way how objects are conceived, because to conceive means to develop further and it is a process. This procedure of objects' temporality leads them (objects) to receive their new function after the rediscovery. This is crucial to temporal-enclosed objects. Images are preceded by temporal objects. I have developed this notion of Stiegler as temporal-enclosed objects in order to accentuate both the state of temporary nature and closeness (open-endedness) of these objects: they transcended into a new time -span after being understood and they are enclosed until being understood in the new context. This transcendence creates an image. The image manifests time. Cinema is a good example of how image manifests time and transcends boundaries. This role in philosophy played by arguments and images in cinema play the same role. Images in cinema are neither present or represent anything, in cinema events take place as long as temporary-enclosed objects transgress and become the subject of the cultural translation. Arguments in philosophy also work in the same way; therefore all the objects considered in

philosophy in a certain way are temporal-enclosed objects because thinking of objects brings them to the state of being in time.

Kant, who divided the world into 'phenomena' and 'noumena' couldn't speak about the temporality of objects, because there was not such a technique as the cinema and philosophy was ignorant of images and of culture.¹³ There was no knowledge questioning time and it emerged only in the 19th century, Riemann's space could be just one example. But Kant famously speaks of aesthetics and the capacity of aesthetics to perform what is not available to the reason in a pure form. Sensitivity is open to ever-changing 'things-in-themselves', that cannot be so easily grasped by rational structures. Another reason is, of course, the separation, which artificially occurred in the Western metaphysics by dividing the world into the intellectual and the emotional without seeing their connection. The effort made by Kant via Hegel however triggered the minds of younger generation of intellectuals and as a result the whole generation of philosophers associated with the Jena school (to mention but one) took seriously art and poetry that alongside mathematics and physics could play the role in understanding of the world.¹⁴ But the real question arises in the 20th century with the rise of the 'culture industry', which was deeply motivated by new technologies and their capacities to provide temporal structures. Objects that are created by these structures are in time due to the fast growth of the industry, yet they contain memory as recorded evidence. These objects are temporal.

These objects are associative and they provide further associations.¹⁵ This is why I call it 'enclosed' and even after becoming 'open' it continues to be questioned. So, it is a never ending process and the relation between the consciousness and object is on-going and therefore temporal. In fact a new, epistemological life of these objects starts after being grasped by the consciousness, although in a different form, since these objects become part and parcel of the consciousness. A melody may not be a question of everyday life

for the listener, but after being remembered, each time heard it reminds about the first encounter, the encounter with the technique, because memory formed by means of the technology and developed further as a technique rather than a primordial object, in –itself alienated and separated from the consciousness. By entering into memory this alienated, separated temporal object alienates the subject and separates him/her from being detached to the primordial. For example after listening to a melody, further associations will be constituted by the listening itself is the technique constituted by the virtue of the gramophone. This process brings the alien object or the other into the space of the subject. Therefore a novel understanding of the melody, that is not ‘the image-consciousness’ as Husserl puts it or ‘a technical object’ as Stiegler puts it, but it is the image that associates them with other objects of the world, that are stable: ‘stable objects’. This analogue between temporal objects and stable objects is made here to show that the notion of temporality is applicable to all kinds of objects. The number ‘three’ is a temporal object as three apples or three exactly identical stones-what makes them temporal is their appearance to the virtue of knowing. This means that ‘stable objects’ can also be understood as temporal ones, since the only stability is that these objects may not change their form, but thinking about them changes depending on the angle. Because temporal objects are different from “stable objects” that are not in time but made by time, temporal objects continue to remain temporary after being grasped by consciousness.¹⁶ Just by passing I would like to bring an example of taking a photograph, when you can point the camera at different angles and from different angles.¹⁷ Their nature of being as images alterity may be shown in an example of the Russell’s paradox: in set of 3, the number three itself may not be included, but the technique of the ‘bracketing ‘of the set, which will be (temporarily) called three provides memory of set called “3” and while it is a number referred, a point of reference, itself is not included in this set: the set of all sets which do not contain themselves. Melody which is recorded in the

gramophone is heard as it is recorded, the voice which is inscribed to which both a singer (a primary source) and the listener (who listens to the inscribed voice from the tertiary retention) are alienated: memory takes place in the state of otherness. The same may be true in the example of the letters of the alphabet: what happens to letters when they lose the connection with the voice that they inscribe: the voice turns into dashes and dots, to technics of the inscription as the image! The question here arises about temporal objects as defined by Husserl as 'image-consciousness' and by Stiegler as technical: these objects may simply be called images that manifest time. Images solidify and enclose the lived experience, the act of consciousness and recorded memory and provide a tremendous task for knowledge. Images are these temporal-enclosed objects.

'The third retention', the technology introduced by Stiegler after his critical reading of Husserl is an image or images including everything inscribed and as such recorded from the early papyruses to a latest digital messaging and they are all producing knowledge, which needs to be studied and therefore they are temporal-enclosed objects. I introduced the term 'temporal- enclosed' because the technology is not only the third retention, it is also retention which is enclosed: re-close it means to constitute it fully. For example, "YouTube" offers many films and other visual material in a very chaotic manner, but they could be re-organised to be used by individuals for their own repertoire.¹⁸ The alpha-numeric, the basic mechanism of digital culture, is a temporal-enclosed object in that sense. By the way, as I mentioned above already, Husserl himself talks about the 'internal-time-consciousness' that can be understood as an enclosed as it is deeply internal and potentially may be externalised.

It can be explained in the example of how these objects work in the cinematic montage. One may even speak of the 'post- cinematic' effects, since the visual culture is affected by the cinema most effectively. In this context cinematic images means that, since the triumph of the cinema, all new media is strongly

influenced by this form in both artistic and technological ways. Now with the growth of the influence of new media the late cinema itself is referring to new media forms such as advertising or surveillance cameras, to mention but two. This creates a cross-circulation of images within the enclosed space of the visual culture. For example the film “Hidden” by Haneke has references to CCTV. Another example is the reference to the film of Tarkovsky by Lars von Trier in his film “Melancholia”: a shot refers to the apples on the window and a horse in the garden known from the work of former. This inter-textual manoeuvre is very characteristic for the age of the proliferation of images. The proliferation also includes images becoming increasingly cinematic and the subject of re-orientation.

Just by the way of explanation another reason for the treatment of temporal objects as images is to provide the deserved place for the image as it was excluded from history of philosophy, most famously from Plato’s republic, although being present in everyday life since the very beginning of the human . Stiegler elaborates palaeontologist André Leroi-Gourhans’ notion that technology is organised inorganic matter and essentially a form of memory, constitutive of human temporality. Leroi-Gourhan’s work contributes scientific evidence to the discovery of the ‘bipedality’ that transformed "primary" humans into what we look like now. ¹⁹ The freeing of hands led to primary societies' comprehension of the hand as a tool. The freeing of the hands helped humans to stand up on their feet more firmly and to look directly. It opened the face and made looking possible. The direct line of sight contributed to a view of the world. This is how visibility entered human experience. This earliest instance of the use of technique constituted the means of seeing. The liberation of the face and hands made it possible to look directly at the surrounding world. After this achievement, and after the same gesture was constantly repeated over a long period, memory facilitated the repeated operation of hands and face as tools.

Memory first came into existence through this first mnemonic technique. What had become a technique was memory, and memory as a tool assisted humans as it developed through associations. These associations mobilized the primal impulse as the supplement making it possible to exteriorize knowledge of the surrounding world. Crucial to Gourhan's understanding of human evolution is the notion that the transition to bipedality freed the hands for gesturing and the face for seeing and later speaking and that the development of the cortex, of technology and of language all allowed the 'adoption of an upright stance'²⁰. What characterises humanity as distinct from animals is thus the fact that tools and technology are a third kind of memory and as such a new form of anticipation of programming.

'Proliferation of images' is perhaps one of the most common phrases in contemporary art and media discourse, yet it lacks sufficient definition. It may be correct to say that this phrase is not easily definable, but it can be described and explained because of the impact of the phenomenon of proliferation on image production.²¹ Borrowed from political debates around nuclear and chemical proliferation, the expression is simply accepted as characterizing global circulation of images. This usage makes some sense inasmuch as the proliferation of images at the turn of the 21st century is similar to the proliferation of nuclear and chemical missiles after the Second World War, but the use of the term with reference to the visual world still requires further clarification. Such clarification is all the more urgently needed because this single phrase has generated many debates and discussions and has formed the basis of many projects addressing the 'condition of the image'.

The 'condition of the image' is characterised by images increasingly creating their own reality. This reality is a reality of knowledge, in which visual images are appropriated along with ideas in order to understand events and things in our complicated time. What happens with visual images can be understood in the

words expressed by the French filmmaker Abel Gance: “The time of the image has come”.²² Images have existed since ancient times, of course, but with the emergence of the visual image as the prominent entity, the status of images begins to change drastically. In the words of German filmmaker and theorist Alexander Kluge:

“Since the Ice Age approximately, streams of images, of so-called associations, have moved through the human mind, prompted to some extent by an anti-realistic attitude, by the protest against an unbearable reality”.²³

These associations have an order organised by spontaneity. Memory and intuition, laughter and memory are based on these associations. These associations can be observed more easily today in cinematic images than in history books. Although the kind of associations described are 'industrialized' more thoroughly in cinematic images it is also important to remember that images are intrinsically more susceptible than phrases to the semi-conscious work of 'association'. Alexander Kluge perceives history as cinema, in the sense of “the more-than-ten-thousand-year-old-cinema to which the invention of the film strip, projector and screen only provided a technological response”.²⁴ Since the industrial revolutions, the role of the visual image has become more prominent. Images that were used by visual artists for a limited audience for centuries started to spread as a result of the invention of the photography and mass-circulation print media. Historically, the notion that visual images might play a role similar to that of ideas emerged for the first time in the eighteenth century, although this idea had little influence at the time. When the Scottish philosopher David Hume suggested in his *Treatise on Human Understanding* (written in 1738 and published in 1740) that visual images can be used in association with ideas and causes to make understanding possible, he was ignored.²⁵ Visual images only came to be considered seriously in the century of the proliferation of images in art and media. If in the 20th century after the emergence of modernism in art images became ubiquitous it is because the

exuded subject returned in a full hysteria. It provided the growth of the modern image industry on the one hand and the images of emancipation albeit in a wild form now and then taking the thought into consideration in a hesitating manner. A complete separation that took place between the rational and emotional, readable and visible reached their triumph as a result of the global re-orientation of images and the crisis of culture again.²⁶

I must confess that my own understanding of this separation is a main point of interest and hope that this understanding will reorient our culture again. Images that were excluded from the regions of intelligence and their return in our time are a justification for the separation, but again in one-sided manner: now the time of images comes, let's get rid of the intellectual structures and make art only.

At the same time it is only in the 20th century that visual images could be understood as something "good to think with", or as knowledge in its own right. It is important here to understand that this does not mean either art or intellect should dominate: rather, they are inextricably mixed. This conception also challenges the relation of a visual artwork to the subject. Images are no longer associated only with visual art: today they have come to be understood in relation to literary, sonic and other sources. Alongside their use in the arts, images are also used ubiquitously in the media. Images are crucial components of business meetings and politics, where spectacular slide shows and 'power-point presentations' give them an "attractive" tone. It is appropriate to remember the powerful phrase describing our times as the "frenzy of the visible"²⁷. Visual images are used everywhere, just as words were used in the 19th century until their condensation and their conceptual possibilities were explored by new research structures and new disciplines, such as linguistics, literary theory etc. There is something similar underway in our times in relation to images. *Retentions* (spatial intuitions) provide the possibility for intensive

reconstruction (recording or the third retention). The reconciliation of the technics and thought is possible again by another form of recorded memory: cinema. It is not by chance Deleuze called cinema a philosophy of our times.

The ‘spatial intuitions’ can be retained objectively by the intensive reconstruction of the stream of consciousness. In the cinematic means this spatiality is usually taken as the discrete image. In the cinema the discreteness of the image consists of a fragment being stretched to the frame to simulate reality. The discreteness of the shot is framed by the technique which was discovered at the very early age of the cinema and contains the experience of pointing the camera to the subject from different points, which is called ‘an angle shot’. The angle shot refers to a picture taken with the camera pointed at an angle from the horizontal. There is an interesting observation made by Jean-Luc Godard in relation to the angle shot and its impact on montage.

In the conversation with the French film theorist Youseef Ishagphour Jean-Luc Godard discusses the angle shot being the precondition of the montage. Godard first discusses the work of the French artist Edgar Degas, which consists of the images of dancers in his drawing from an angle. Godard explains that he made drawings in this manner because Degas was a photographer before moving into his drawings and paintings. In the late 1880’s he photographed many dancers and later he used his experience as a reference to his drawings. From this time he had knowledge of an angle shot.²⁸ Sergei Eisenstein discovered ‘the angle’ from Degas and developed it into a montage. Jean Luc Godard describes Eisenstein’s method of montage as ‘dialectic between the object and film-makers judgement’ which is developed from the method of the angle shot and it is similar to Degas’s composition of putting angles side by side:

“It is easy to see that by putting two angles side by side you get an effect of the true montage, which enabled me to say afterwards, that Eisenstein discovered the angle after Degas and others in paintings and having discovered the angle he discovered the montage.”

Godard pays an attention to the angle shot in the development of cinematic culture and its impact on montage:

“You put three angle shots of lions together and you have a lion getting up, because of the angles, not because of the montage-montage has nothing to say about the lion, it is just a lion-but you have an idea of something getting up, that’s where there is a precondition of the montage.”²⁹

Having an idea of filming in a particular way and bringing this idea into the shot is a very subjective activity of filmmaking. The possibility of re-orientation emerges with the process of montage, which starts from the first instalments called *derushage* or rushes of the video.³⁰ Derushage belongs to a field of the elementary structure of meaning. This structure is understood by Greimas as the ‘semiotic square’, which is an interaction of semiotic constraints.³¹ In other words, the opposition of “time-not time” or “image-not image” creates a certain space by assembling the implications of contrary signs based on their differences. In their difference “image-not image” creates associated meaning, which can be placed on top of another in order to create a layered effect and/or to create a map of logical possibilities. It can be used as a heuristic device. This heuristic device further developed into the assemblage, which in its turn helped to create *a new grammar of spacing, imitation by association and the constitution of the subject.*³²

The crucial role played here is an intention to understand the contents of temporal objects, since these objects demand an ‘encoding-decoding’ model and they are not available by themselves.³³ They manifest the lost time and simultaneously demonstrate a possibility of reproduction or retention. These two activities play the role of reconstructing what is lost. It takes place by understanding of the contents of these objects. For subjects that are intended toward these objects the intention provides the space of ‘ruckfragen’, the return and the retrieval.³⁴ It also provides the specific context. Before the prominence of technical objects the role of memory is one of the functions of aesthetic

objects, but technical objects left unthought and not understood because of the absence of the thought about these objects or about the technics altogether. With the re-emergence of the new objects, that are unimaginable without the impact of technology, there is a need to think of this question as temporal- enclosed-objects, because the internal-time-consciousness makes the connection to the external world possible: if there is something internal, it may potentially be externalised in a specific manner. Temporal- enclosed -objects create specific contexts with their specific meaning. For example, we cannot speak of Kant taken out of the context of Enlightenment, if we want to understand him correctly in the same way as we cannot take Lyotard out of the context of the 'postmodern'. Because Kant has a place in history we need to link the context of his philosophy to the notion of placing or how his philosophy is placed in history of philosophy. Temporal objects create a specific context in this sense. The context provides the possibility of temporal meaning. These meanings are polemical vectors. There are two understanding of the context: a) historical context, e.g. Kant in the context of Enlightenment b) a thematic context, e.g. Kant in the context of critical philosophy. Taken out of the context, subjects receive another meaning and this meaning is temporal. A subject receives its temporal meaning in the given context only and the context of the meaning is the context of the subject. For example, the context of the image is the time.

After being grasped in their specific contexts, temporal –enclosed-objects may be developed into other forms as they are residues of memory and potential images. It is also the point of the stipulation of the condition of the image. In its turn the final work provides conjectures or specific contexts. Specific contexts provide the possibility of conclusions that work as a certain rhetoric at a given time. "Conjectures" and "articulations" used by Stuart Hall may be an example of this kind of conclusion.³⁵ It also shows that there is no closure and therefore no determination. Instead of the determination there is an imitation, which is not

simply copying what is seen, but a particular form of resemblance to a specific context. It could be said that this resemblance is the discovery of the lost subject as they create associations and help to connect the present to the lost subject. Temporal-enclosed objects provide specific contexts for a conjectural rhetoric which suspends the meaning by turning it into the vector of time. Husserl's notion of 'bracketing' is an example of this.³⁶ The 'time-image', 'memory-art' are temporalities or suspended meanings and the schema in which time produces memory, memory produces art, art produces temporalities or conjectures for an expression (enunciation).

This conjecture is also the point of trans-individuation.³⁷ The 'time-image' manifests the partiality and the partiality of the world joined together by memory, art and temporalities produced by them. Temporalities are also partial objects in their turn opening up the space for further temporalities. Partial objects as temporal-enclosed-objects are conjectures that provide specific contexts and temporary meanings and articulations. They create rhetoric, retentions and reproductions. These temporalities provide the arena of trans-individuation. In this way temporal objects are available for the use of every individual and as such they stand against sacred objects and fetishism that swerves away from the [direct] access to the world.

The partiality of the world becomes more visible with the proliferation of images. If there are temporal objects it is because the cross-circulation of the partiality manifests itself in objects. The partial becomes more visible with the proliferation and the temporal object manifests this partiality that provides a rhetorical articulation. The time of the image (partiality) intensifies the image-movement for the trans-individuation.

A novel understanding of the image cannot be full without taking objects (temporal-enclosed-objects) into the account. In philosophy as well as in art,

objects are not only “real” things but virtual associations and everything; a space-time or a chair or the human or the non-human can be considered as an object and equally understood, because in the virtual world they are all made equal for thought. There are no good or bad objects and they are all temporal and equally powerful as far as they intensify thinking and memory. It is because temporal-enclosed objects are open to influences and adoption by their partiality. Coupled with the question of memory these temporal-enclosed objects open- up the space for a new understanding of images as associations. I claim that in the condition of the proliferation, which is a new condition of images, they are not directly perceived but enter into the lives of subject’s by associations. Yet further perception depends upon the subject or it is “up to the individual’s” intention to make a sense out of the retentions. Associations work like a montage that may lead to the making of an image or to imitate in order to restore delayed memory brought back by associative retentions. It is why I call these objects ‘temporal-enclosed,’ because these objects are enclosed until they are grasped and after being grasped the object loses its temporal meaning and creates difference. An example is an index made in alphabetical order: it is enclosed, although on the first glance seems to be well ordered by joining the letters of the alphabet. But soon one realises that this order is made by connecting letters of the alphabetical ordering only, but words have very diverse and different meanings. Associations that are made with the order disappear as soon as one understands this paradox. A shift from the appearance (alphabetic ordering) to the conception (rhetoric articulation) shows that the sense is not how objects appear, but how they are conceived. Dictionaries, encyclopaedias and guide books are temporal-enclosed -objects in this sense.

We can see the world in temporal objects but we cannot turn the world into them. Temporal objects manifest traces of memory and memory takes place as these traces disappear like in Freud’s “*Mystery Writing Pad*”.³⁸ This makes the

world partial, yet the 'invisible' world rests in what has disappeared. Kant was right to say that there are things that are separated from the phenomena.³⁹ His error was saying that the 'things-in-themselves' cannot be known, instead of thinking of 'things-in-themselves' as a place, where the thought already took place. Objects are caused by the constant substitution of the object for the thought. The difference is in an object and how the object is conceived. Kant wanted to make present 'things-in-themselves' by correlating them to the phenomena (as the blueprint) as the phenomenal world is a schema that can be extended to noumena. This is criticised by many as Kant's error called 'the correlation problem', where phenomena and noumena are correlated to make the reason as a mediator between the two; by separating or dividing the two.⁴⁰ I would argue that the error is not in this and the error is Kant's not considering that the world which is accessible to us also consist of objects that are temporal and enclosed themselves already divided and constantly in division by manifesting memory or delayed memory in the current. My own experience as an artist makes me ask and to answer the question: how an artist is working with objects? Working with objects means thinking with objects and to fix how the thought replaces the object. It may also be true of looking at art. An example is 'watching the film': because 'making the film' is the reconstruction of the past made present by projection, 'watching the film' is a kind of remembrance of the past in the present and it is the encounter with thoughtful objects. Objects are everywhere: objects may be the number 0, or the theory of articulations or VHS or the map of the world. The difficulty is finding the way how the difference entered into the world of objects without separating between makings and looking, but how differently these activities may be constituted.

Willem Flusser said that the aesthetic and intellectual level of the generation of new media is lowered down because of their encounter with too many images that provide associations without letting them to think.⁴¹ But in fact the

intellectual or aesthetic levels don't depend on the quantity of texts or images, quite on the contrary, more texts and images create more choice. These levels depend on the virtue of training and exercising. Exercising like a good writer working every day to improve the quality of writing. The crisis on the other hand is connected to the proliferation in this sense and the problem of the proliferation as a novel understanding of things is not taken seriously. The reproduction of machines, gadgets are all temporarily manifest memory, which may or may not be taken seriously. They create specific contexts by their very temporalities and until grasped they are having a unique context and after grasping they become models that are possible either to reproduce or to accept it just as a "tertiary retention" in the sense Stiegler calls the technology. The full understanding of 'technics' in this sense provides a ground and a remedy out of the crisis, which is the "identity thinking" ending in prejudices. Everywhere in the arts, media or politics we see this crisis and the impossibility of the escape. This crisis is widening the gap between mathematics and aesthetics, between objects and subjects, between humans and machines. The answer to Flusser's problem is in this gap and separation between images and the rest, between different forms and languages.

If there is a crisis of the subject then it is connected to a problem of not wanting to know, having no intention and the denial of access, rather than the impossibility of having such an access. Temporal-enclosed - objects provide a possibility of an access and many possibilities are disseminated in the terrain of culture and need to be gathered together. The crisis is already explained by Adorno by the term mentioned above: the "identity thinking".⁴² Culture industry, in order to expand its influence increasingly uses stereotypes which motivates prejudices, rather than knowledge. For instance, the rise of nationalistic prejudice is connected to the media domination of immigrants as outsiders.

The heuristic device introduced by Greimas manages to explain how not to be trapped in ‘identity thinking’.⁴³ Another example is Mendeleev’s table: it is very careful, rigorous yet open to more elements to come. Husserl also wanted to create a philosophy as a rigorous discipline in this sense. It would also be appropriate to apply this idea to the political understanding of the ‘refugee crises.

The imitation may be a new heuristic device to resist the fundamentalism of the identity thinking. As it is already said, with the proliferation of technologies and their increasing and intensive use, human memory is almost completely translated into temporal objects and because of this any work (of art) is an imitation of what is recorded. The combination of the imitation (making images out of the existing images that are recorded) and the imitation game (memory restored in machines) may define a new direction of art. The conflict between creation and imitation is the conflict between fiction and fact, fiction creates perceptions, and facts create associations. They together can be reduced to alphanumeric functions as a basis of any perception and any association that increases the capacity to form an index and order alphabetically otherwise, which helps to give a form the view of the world, to grammatise. An example is a car: it can be combined in a way like a grammar, but whereas the result of combining the words creates another word, the purpose of making a car is different: because a car needs to move. Differences are constantly obliterating each other and connecting again. The reason is that what is imitated is not nature as it was in Aristotle, but a technological time which consists of different layers as recorded memory. It is how temporal-enclosed -objects produce further recorded memory that may lead to further imitations. This is like Stiegler’s term ‘acting out’ or the phase-shift”. Understood from this angle to imitate means an intention towards the primal impulse, which is also called a creative process, which is the leftover of the subjectivity. Subjectivity itself is

the historical phase in the development of knowledge of the world. With the complete replacement of memory by a 'recorded memory' imitation becomes a new phase, which enlivens the world through associations. Associations will replace any form of knowledge and instead memory there will be memeplexes.

⁴⁴ On the one hand, to receive knowledge will be easier, because of the recognition of the technology as something that supplies human knowledge, rather than another tool. The imitation will remain a great option for the art of memory, since most of the population is absorbed by the memory industry.

There is already a generation that is immersed in the world of technologies which allows to combine any knowledge without much difficulty. I don't want to exaggerate the possibility of being immersed in the world of knowledge, without even knowing about it. However in order to be able to adequately respond to this immersive reality the role of re-classification of knowledge structures in a new way, like a new Mendeleev's table is a necessity. ⁴⁵ With the help of programming at their basis of the alphanumerical space of indexing and carefully considering temporal-enclosed -objects, association by connecting and imitation by image making may be a set of good tools for a new classification.

03.07.2017

Notes:

¹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/phaedrus.html>

² This triad is used by Stiegler following Simondon. It should also be noted that the term ‘technologies’ is a broad notion which might easily include ‘temporal objects’; and they mediate by playing a connecting role to join theory/ideology with reality in constructing a rationalist culture in Enlightenment France.

³ Stiegler says that there are techniques that come before thought. Technics is the beginning of any formation that provides the possibility of thought. In other words the vision and seeing comes before the thought, the ability to see made possible to think and to ask questions. We are technics but also machine that produce machines. In order to catch up with our machines we need to intensify our own machinality and to improve. The mechanism that provides the possibility to become a thinker is memory. Like memorising gestures improved primates to bipedality, in our age of programming this should be a question again. (Images as a technique are due to the technologization of the images in cinema, media and elsewhere on the one hand oversaturation of images by meaning on the other hand.) Technics has become the external memory and the fragmentation of consciousness by temporality motivates the partiality and temporal industrialisation of consciousness.

⁴ This content is the world and a temporal object is the part of the world, but this partiality is also an object of inquiry. Immanuel Kant described these objects as ‘things-in –themselves’, *noumena*, objects of inquiry, investigation or analysis of the workings of the world, which Husserl expresses in the term ‘bracketing’.

⁵ Edmund Husserl. *Cartesian Meditations*, (Translated by Dorion Cairns), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977

⁶ Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*, trans. J. B. Brough, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 1990

⁷ Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*. tr. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford: SUP. 2011

⁸ Bernard Stiegler adopted the term from Gilbert Simondon.

⁹ Reference to Jacques Lacan’s notion of the object *a* and Homi Bahabha, *The culture’s between*.

¹⁰ In some words I would like to explain my own understanding of philosophy from the materialist point of view: everything is a matter, the residues of the time. Matter produces Ideas, so there is no division between the matter and the idea. However there are objects as a result of the formation of materials that can be divided into physical things and ideal things. Ideas in their turn materialised, either by forces of nature, i.e. fossils, stones, mountains and other geo-biological objects or by culture, letters of the alphabet is materialisation of the voice as an idea. Matter is manifested in images and they are traces of space-time. Matter (images) and ideas (images) are similar: matter is the condition (stipulation) of being and an idea is a tool for an explanation of the matter in the world of stipulated

organic and non-organic things. Matter is temporary because it is conditional. These conditions are mediating in between the organic and non-organic: organic is all physical things, non-organics are all cultural things. Organic is physical and non-organic is cultural, they are related in the world of ideas by Mathematics and Aesthetics. Ideas are expressed in numbers, symbols, words, images, senses and they are all called Things. In the world of science and rationalisation the organic and non-organic may be connected, for example, by the alphabetic ordering. Objects and things are similar entities although an object differs from the thing, that thing is what we can recognise and object what needs to be studied in depth. A Temporal-Enclosed Object is a heuristic device explaining this phenomenon.

¹¹ Otherwise technology will dominate further by creating more stereotypes. The conflict between the curiosity and ignorant is the conflict between the culture and the industry.

¹² Sol Lewitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, *Artforum*, June, 1967

¹³ There is a controversy continuing in relation to Kant's work at least since Husserl and until the recent 'speculative realism' in relation to the transcendence and objects without taking into the account the state of the science and art during Kant, which was rather different and Time wasn't conceptualised as a separate independent from space a substance.

¹⁴ It is also the turn to aesthetics that took place in the post-Kantian and often in neo-Kantian philosophy via Hegel's dialectic. The Jena school is just one example.

¹⁵ Association : from the Greek means connection

¹⁶ It should also be noted that temporal objects also include historical events that took place historically and remains to be grasped by knowledge. So what have been at times liked seemed eternal states, such as empires, kingdoms or states like the Soviet Union are also temporal objects that existed in history and suspended their existence but the discourse about them continues in a never-ending manner.

¹⁷ See footnote 22 about Degas below

¹⁸ In some films, there are elements, which, in contrast to e.g. Hollywood films, do not really describe exactly what happens, but give the receiver a wide field of possible interpretations. For example, in Tarkovsky's films we come across apples in the window, which can be seen as a hint that the lifetime of the figure shown in the film also exists in this particular cut. However, there are a lot of open questions, such as what happens to these apples? The film leaves the receivers with the opportunity to continue the film in their heads.

¹⁹ Andre Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, MIT Press, 1993 pp. 25-58

²⁰ Andre Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, MIT Press, 1993 pp. 25

²¹ If in our age of proliferation we speak of the 'industrial temporisation of the consciousness' it is because the world itself is partial, as a time-space configuration it never comes to the full appearance. What appears to the consciousness as the result of the intention is the 'striking evidence' of the partial

object. In the industrialised world an example of this kind of formation is watching the film. The film usually consists of the fragment that is stretched to the time of the screening to create the world, which we perceive for the whole.

²² Abel Gance quoted in Peter Wollen, *Signs and Meaning in Cinema*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1974 p. 56

²³ Alexander Kluge, *On Film and the Public Sphere*, in *New German Critique*, 24/25. 1981-82, p. 209

²⁴ *Ibid.* p. 209

²⁵ David Hume, *The Essential Philosophical Works*, London: Wordsworth Classic of World Literature, 2011

²⁶ A fatal separation created by rationalism between the reason and the sense, the emotional and rational, Being and Everyday the question posed by Husserl following Kant. Kant simply refuses to see in 'things-in-themselves' any possibility of their accessibility to the reason. However, to accept them as a matter of the aesthetics Kant provides an answer for the coming philosophy. Philosophy turns to aesthetics from mathematics often separating them from each other. Husserl in *The Crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology* to the separation of everyday life from the philosophical understanding of being by referring to Galilee's work that mathematicised the everyday. Instead of mathematics the matematisation took over, so to speak it has become institutionalised to control societies by making rationality as a dominating activity. With aesthetics and art similar things are happening and the warning made by Walter Benjamin about the 'aesthetisation of politics' is a very serious one. Adorno saw the problem of the emergence of the culture industry in the fatal separation. Giles Deleuze expresses his interest in the question of the play of difference and repetition and how sense arises from it. Subjectivity is expressed in asking questions, whereas objectivity is relying on already existing answers. This is what creates the conflict between them. This conflict is the conflict between the difference of subjectivity and objectivity and it is also the relation between them. In its turn the subject and the object stand in a similar position. Husserl: intentionality of the consciousness is the subject's direction towards objects. But objects in their turn have the intentionality of being a part of the world. This partiality of the world also provides a temporary state of the subjects' consciousness as partial. In "The Crisis of European Sciences" Husserl points to the separation between science and everyday life in an example of Galileo Galilei. Although everyday life is considered as a methexis of science in the ancient world, where science finds the methexis of the infinite in finitude of the everyday, in modern physics this changes. Galilee mathematized this everyday life, that was considered as a part of the nature and in this way the mathematization of nature took place, while mathematicized nature separated from everyday life. This is also the origin of the crisis that emerges from this fatal separation of the nature from the everyday life, sensible from the reasonable, intellectual from the emotional and the object from the subject. Famously the triumph

of this separation is found in the work of Kant. Kant: in order to have access to things there is a need to create a rational system through which to realize the access (correlationalism). By doing this Kant has separated the world from its meaning while also separating the things-in-themselves from their appearance. This separation later emerged in the fatal separation between the rational and the emotional, which has been criticised by Adorno, especially in his critique of subject-object relationship. Speculative realism, insists on having direct access since things are elsewhere. I find it interesting so I would like to think a bit more on this question. First of all I think that a so-called Kantian correlationalism lies on the basis of the classification of science in the post-Kantian period. I think that the new classification has created a new form of thinking which has provided a strong control as Adorno in his critique of Enlightenment philosophy would say. The strict classification of sciences and their division into the natural and humanities has separated knowledge and in this fatal separation one needs to see a problem of accessibility of consciousness to things.

²⁷ Christian Metz, *Film Language: A Semiotics of Cinema*, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 21

²⁸ Before becoming a painter Degas was a photographer and that is how he knew about the camera and angles. He was also interested in prints of the Japanese artist Hokusai. He developed his own drawings from this experience. Sergei Eisenstein was very well informed and knew art very well, including about the work of Degas and Hokusai. Apart from that he studied Japanese and treated the Japanese calligraphy as ideograms. His theory of the montage, sometimes called the 'parallel montage' is developed from this knowledge. The parallel montage is a reference to the verticality of the film and supposed to mean a parallel to the vertical, angle shot and artist's subjective choice of filming developed to the montage.

²⁹ Jean-Luc Godard and Youssef Ishaghour, *Cinema: The Archeology of Time and Memory of the Century*, London, Berg, 2005. p.15

³⁰ *Derushage* is the term used in Bernard Stiegler: *Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*. tr. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford: SUP. 2011

³¹ Algirdas Julien Greimas, *On Meaning*. trans. Frank Collins and Paul Perron. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987

³² These terms are used in my book *The Time of the Image: A Philosophical Exploration of the Image in the work of Bernard Stiegler* (forthcoming)

³³ Stuart Hall, 'Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse', CCCS, Birmingham, 1973

³⁴ '*Ruckfragen*' is the term used by Edmund Husserl and I adopted this term in order to indicate the importance of the reverse inquiry.

³⁵ Jennifer Darul Slack: The Theory and Method of Articulation in Cultural Studies. In *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, edited by David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. pp. 112-127.

³⁶ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977

³⁷ Trans-individuation is also synonymous with the subjectivity or self-realisation, both of terms I understand as becoming the other overcoming the self by exteriorizing, with the support of technics.

³⁸ Sigmund Freud, A Note upon A Mystic Writing Pad, in *Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, The Vol 19; "The Ego and the ID" and Other Works*, London, Vintage, 2001

³⁹ I.e there is ' things in-themselves '.

⁴⁰ Speculative realism is the reference to a new philosophical group including, Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux and others taking Kantian correlationalism for their point of criticism.

⁴¹ Vilem Flusser, *Writings*, University of Minnesota Press, 2004, pp.71-74

⁴² Theodore W Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, Verso, 2004

⁴³ Algirdas Julien Greimas, *On Meaning*, trans. Frank Collins and Paul Perron. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987

⁴⁴ Although I am very well aware that there are other scientific and popular studies of cultural memory, I am focused on the notion of the 'recorded memory, which helps to constitute subjects differently. If the artificial use of 'memes' or memplexes' is cutting off with the other as it is narcissistic trance, to use McLuhan's term, the supplement, the use of fourth retention is the use of human memory by the human, which provides the chance not to defy the subjectivity as it is inscribed in emotional bonds connecting the self with the other. Memplexes will not replace the human subject, because while creating an artificial memory, 'memplexes' lose the connection with the symbolic and as such it ignores the subject and subjectivity. Whereas the human subject always puts the symbolic on the first place, albeit symbolically (it is unconscious or the subject is always in relation to the symbolic but unconsciously) and that is the way of maintaining the proximity to the other. In McLuhan's words, the problem with the electronic communication has no emotional bonds and defies the symbolic; subjects are in the narcissistic trance. The "friendship" on Facebook is just one example. Media produces programs, whereas art produces objects.

⁴⁵ A clearer understanding of the role of philosophy is needed. Some ideas are noted below, needs to be treated in another research:

a) Philosophy as the condition of beginning and the project of reconstructing points.

b) Philosophy is what establishes a basis out of intentions. Thinking intensifies intentions. Philosophy is a technique or techniques of constant thinking that brings what is intended to the beginning of something new. Philosophy is in this way also a practice of thinking of what and who comes into being as a beginning of something. As the relationship between the syntagm and paradigm goes, some examples given in for explanations of universal theories sometimes developed into concrete disciplines or movements. For example, Aristotle's example of heavy and light objects is at the basis

of experiments by Galileo Galilei. The outcome of this experiment founded modern physics. Or the use of geometric figures by Cezanne in order to create the model of the visible world has opened up the way to a new art that used pure geometry as it did with cubism and others.

c) This meaning of philosophy is lost by centuries as a result of the obsessive classification that gave way to new sciences and arts starting from the seventeenth century and intensified by industrial revolutions. It is extremely important to remember that to this point philosophy and mathematics as a part of it were main catalysts of the progress, so new sciences and arts saturated their work by already existing philosophical knowledge.

d) There is also a shift from mathematics to aesthetics. See also the footnote 24.

e) Now around three hundred years later re-classification is needed, that will take it from a new philosophy (post structuralism etc.)

f) Philosophy as the knowledge of the world (Greeks) and philosophy as a particular knowledge of the world (modern) and metaphysics which is constantly asking questions about beginnings. Husserl's intentionality refers to this.

h) There are also two kinds of theories: constructive and fundamental, a constructive theory is bringing together different parts of the knowledge and building up a picture and a fundamental theory is solidifying knowledge that comes to an existence.

i) The work of philosophy consists of the "step- by- step" construction of the received knowledge.