One-not One, the Other-not the Other

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Knowing what you do, doing what you know: the essence is the function

There is no essence as such and there is no fixed meaning, they both are matters of becoming. In other words what comes into existence during the function are both essence and meaning.

As an artist who makes things out of the vagueness towards their visibility and as a philosopher who believes in thinking from nothing to the being, I don't believe in stories, yet I make stories as the process of making art demands it. I agree with Jean-Luc Nancy who said that 'subject is what it does, it is its act, and its doing is the experience of the consciousness of the negativity of substance'.[1]

One of the most consistent activities in the history of culture is separating one thing from another. Given as a temporary condition it is positive, given as a rule it is negative. To separate a thing into its parts is important in order to understand the whole via its parts, but it needs to be connected back again albeit differently. When separation becomes a matter of quantity, then the whole becomes misinformed by its parts, and parts become malfunctioned or used for the proliferation. It is because the function is separated from the essence of being. The function is an essence, without functioning there is no being. After the separation functioning becomes possible by the virtue of the thought: thinking of the absence of the other opens-up the way towards the re-construction.

How is the function informed by thinking? Instead of saying that thought thinks itself, to insist that thinking as technique transgresses itself, I would say that it is transcendental, in a constant transition, it overcomes the being, it transforms. Metaphysics is re-invented in the thought, that is to say in the technique, is transcendental becoming, the other, the altered image. It is a temporal object which informs the consciousness.[2] Once grasped the temporal object changes, it functions differently. That is also how the difference is made. The difference is often misunderstood in modern thinking, which divides differences into theory and practice and I am critical of this fatal separation.

I look at the question of the functioning of subjects as opposed to the division between theory and practice, which creates separation and hierarchy. In his argument with Descartes Pierre Gassendi insisted that it is the function given to subjects, but not a functioning substance. [3] I apply it to the notion of the 'Greimas's square' (or rather trying to combine Gassendi's critique of the substance over the function in his correspondence with Descartes with highly acclaimed theory of 'Greimas' square'), a very productive lexicographic structure invented by Algirdas Greimas in order to articulate possible forms of functioning for contemporary subjects without falling a prey to the technological determinism.[4] I also allude to a highly metaphorical realm of the 'rhizomes' philosophized by Giles Deleuze , which is a space created for multiplicities as an escape from the hierarchical notion of the 'tree' which creates a dualistic notion of the theory/practice divide.[5] Yet, the main idea of this essay is to try to show that there are ever dissolving elements of the essence in the function. So to speak: there is (none) Essence and Function. To repeat again according to Greimas'   square: functioning as "one not- one". Deleuzes' three syntheses of time: difference and repetition and Bernard Stiegler notions of technicality, a new grammar, images provides me with tools in order to argue for the possibility of images understood through the critique that may help

to initiate a new critique that may be called a trans-positional nominalism: the function of subjects equals the subject as the function.

In most of the recent writings about the labour and the role of the work, it is almost a jargon used, instead of the philosophical language. It is by some misfortune divided into the 'practice' and 'theory' and as such created confusion as a result of the separation. The division between theory and practice is another illusion created after the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century due to the proliferations of new disciplines, including social sciences and humanities and arts. This illusion is a part of history associated with the emergence of the culture industry and creating further confusions. The problem is trying to divide between fact and fiction and the rational and emotional and by dividing to create a restricted order of things as the essential and non - essential. I claim that the essence resides in the function and it is indivisible and constantly reinvented through the function. The essence is manifested in the function. Before going on to explain it in detail I need to clarify the position of the philosophy.

Philosophy is a discipline which asks the question: how the world is possible as it is. In order to understand this question a philosopher first poses the question, theorizes and then conceptualizes his/her understanding of the question and then makes a decision. There are four steps to the understanding:

1. Problematizing,

2. Theorizing,

3. Conceptualizing,

4. Making decision.

These four steps together form a basis of the philosophical work and they cannot be separated or divided as different jobs, they are all parts of the same activity.

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Theory is a specific form of knowledge that provides rules and ideas about paradigms, which may or may not be used by philosophy. What is theory? In a contemporary academic world it is almost a vulgar explanation of anything when it comes to thinking. It is also the establishment's desire to get rid of philosophy. Theory is not a discipline but it is a technique of making (!) a sense of what comes out of thinking. It is a form of knowledge alongside concepts, ideas, images etc. It involves making and thinking at the same time. Wrongly taken for thinking only and separated from its function as making sense out of knowledge, theory has become 'a jargon for the authenticity' of industrial populism.[6]

The 'practice' is another jargon that is used as the terminology. Historically, for the first time it was applied to a 'magic' performed by medicine and then entered into the lexicon of philosophy as the possible realization of what is written or theorized and the defining role played in 'proofing' of the theory.[7] It is used in some ways from Aristotle's 'praxis' via Marx's use of 'theory/practice 'divide as the formation of the 'general intellect'. In the 20th century it has been used by some key philosophers such as Henry Lefebvre , Michel de Certeau and others in order to explain the increasing rationalization of everyday life by the assertion of thought to reality. In highly industrialised/ institutionalized societies this divide is taken up as the basis of the classification of the labour. As a result the function, the capacity of the thought informed by the function and the function informed by the thought, is lost. Subjects don't function because the function is copied to the restrictive space of the division of theory/practice. That is why instead of functioning there is a management: economy doesn't function but managed, the culture doesn't function but managed, politics don't function and instead administered, knowledge doesn't function but administered.

One needs to think of the function in order to articulate the potential hidden and repressed by the theory/practice divide. Examples are Spinoza's functional geometry: since mathematics in translation means 'learning' as the on-going activity it also means a constant functioning as the learning subject. The same may be true of today's constant improvement of computer user's capacities by constantly learning new applications and programs.

The essence of human is function

Different from the over-rationalized pragmatics, functioning is about the shift and change. What is changing is the essence (eidos): because the (none) essence is possible in the function only. Instead of saying that there is no essence one needs to accept that there is an essence which is constantly changing because of the function. As Pierre Gassendi argues against Descartes by saying that, only functions are available to subjects but not the functioning substance.[8] Function is given to all, but not all are aware of the essence. In his comments on Descartes' work Gassendi argued for the failure of Cartesian philosophy in trying to establish the reality and certainty of innate ideas. Further he developed his argument by trying to find a middle way between scepticism and dogmatism. It included his argument of the impossibility of "essences" (inner natures) of things, by relying on the probable knowledge of the world received by "appearances". [9]This knowledge is sufficient to explain experience. "Nothing acts on itself, the foot doesn't kick itself".[10]

Descartes did not accept atomistic thought of the substance in terms of extension. 'I think therefore I am' means that the thought extends subjects to being. But he was not aware of the theories of difference and repetition, which came into existence in the 20th century only, and he couldn't say that an extension creates difference; the thinking subject is an extension of that difference. He was a dualist, although apart from being a great philosopher he

was a great mathematician and because of this he recognized the existence of 'res cogitas', the rest of the consciousness. Gassendi, who was materialist-atomist, criticized Descartes from the position of the essence being extended to the function. It is a contribution made by Gassendi, which put under the doubt the dualistic theory of the substance and instead recognising their interrelationship of supplementing each-other.

In the 'semiotic square' by Greimas the closure is created by the impossibility of the substance acting on itself, but instead acting by coupling or by the contradictory , by its "other" like in "death" -"not death". This schema shows the full complexity of any given semantic term *(seme)*. Greimas points out that any given 'seme' entails its opposite or "contrary". "Life" (S1) for example is understood to its contrary "death" (S2). Rather than rest at this simple binary opposition (S), however, Greimas points out that the opposition "life" "death" suggests, what Greimas terms a contradictory pair (-S), i.e. "not-life" (-S1) and "not death" (-S2):

Death   Life

Non-Life   Not Death

To think of the reality in terms of the 'actuality' (by putting reality under erasure) and in this actuality to act means the function can be attributed to the interaction of different systems that produce it. One can construct. Gassendi:

"Even a single word entails limited panoply of related terms that could potentially be stray out across a function (…). Thus, to take, a familiar example, the figure sun organizes around itself a figural field that includes rays, light, heat, air, transparency, opacity, clouds, etc..." [11]

For Gassendi in the function one finds the sign of substance through the measure, height etc. An example by Greimas is the use of yellow traffic lights, which indicates where to go or not to go and in this way forces subjects to act according to its rule.[12]In this case there is no essence then and human functioning is activated by rules of organized artificiality that confuses the subject, forcing us to think of the divide since there is someone who can indicate where to go or not to go. According to Gassendi these modalities free the subject from the substance in the function. In Greimas the arbitrariness of the language emancipates the subject from commands like in the traffic light. These modalities and arbitrary elements of the function constitute the subject as thinking and making at the same time. The function here opposes to the strict essentialism. What is needed is to bring together the confidence to act by employing a possible available knowledge to make things happen. The ambivalent functioning in relation to the ideological contradictions created by theory/ practice will disqualify essentialism and provide a convincing understanding of the machinality as one of the basic features of subjectivity. Instead of rejecting machines, one needs to accept the self as a machine.

Machinality, Technics and Art

Machinality is an important feature in the formation of the subject. Machinality connects techniques with art and both are characteristic for the human being. Moreover, the machinality provides the movement from being to becoming. Machinality and movement are closely connected. This connection is the one between the being and becoming. If people make art, that means the link between the being and becoming is discovered. In a similar way, when people migrate, for instance, that also means they have understood the link between the being and becoming and they have created a trajectory of becoming, which is motivated by the machinality.The human is technical and therefore the human is the function and functioning is possible because of this

technicality. The most impressive technique is giving the birth. From very early childhood I have been interested in machines. Later this interest helped me to realize that machinality is an important feature of the human. By machinality I mean the technical capacity of the human to observe, to learn, and to make things. So machinality stands for techniques. Technics, used in plural by Bernard Stiegler is the combination of technique, technicity and technology. [13] Machinality is understood in this sense. Machinality that provides the technical reproducibility of ideas alongside creativity is a crucial function. Machinality is fostering a technical reproducibility, whereas creativity, as the reminder of the subjectivity, elaborates upon these remnants. The first involves technique, technicity and technological or "technics", as Bernard Stiegler puts it, whereas the second involves, mythological aspects of the human interest. Historically their separation from each other was the case, although they are interrelated and mixed, or even confused, yet the connecting element of the both persists: thinking. By separating the first from the second, or machinality from creativity, this connecting point is lost, the thought becomes absent. Because of this, historically in materialist aesthetics and ethics, subjectivity often replaces the machinality and as such the role of machines is denigrated as senseless. Yet, the problem is of course, in trying to see the role machines play and to see in machines the humanistic as in humanistic the machinality in their inseparable state. Humans are machines; machines are humans and the most important thing is not to reduce the role of machines to gadgets, and the role of humans to players. This question receives its crucial point in our times, in the age of the proliferation of machines. There are also times when one realizes that there is no other choice but to recognize the role machines play in our society. When in the past century Albert Einstein or Norbert Wiener made warnings about the role machines play,   it was also the warning that the effects produced by this ignorance may be like an effect of pharmacy, which Stiegler theorized recently by elaborating upon Plato/Derrida.[14] Like any other event,   the event of

machinality has a double effect: remedy and poison. Husserl, Heidegger, Gilbert Simondon, Deleuze, Derrida, Stiegler and the list could be much longer, all see in machines the capacity to act precisely because we are machines. As Deleuze and Guattari famously stated: We are desiring machines! [15] Subjects receive new qualities with the support of techniques (understood as a triad of technique, technicity and technology). The question resides in the ability or being able to understand technics philosophically. Technics have the potential to bring anew quality to life. The question is to understand and to realize the ability provided by technics. In primary society's technique rescued humans from barbarism. It preceded philosophy, culture and science. How can new technologies rescue humanity from the emerging neo-barbarism? As Simondon once said:

"technical objects must be made for men and not to enslave them".[16]

Is there regress or the possibility to move forward? One needs to think of the formation not as a principle, but as a process of trans-individuation. As Stiegler puts it:

(…) individuation is the com-position of forces that bind it and then turn it into a process, that to say, a dynamic.[17]

What is called by Stiegler "tertiary retentions" or "retentional apparatuses" preceded by the geometrization of time and spatialisation.[18] If matter is about giving birth and productivity, then humans are part of the matter, since humans produce and above all humans produce the thought. Like any other productions the thought can also be impersonal and in this sense speculative realists may be correct saying that 'thought thinks itself'. [19]However in our lives not the thought matters but what it provides: the conditions of living. Otherwise they do matter equally! The subject and the object are the invention of thought equally deserving their place. Subject and object connected to each other through the mediation. It is the thought that mediates and the process of reification depends on mediation. Mediation is also altering, which gives a new meaning.

Reification encompasses the subject and object, as well as subjectivity and objectivity. Singularity is impersonal. But the impersonal may also receive its verification. It may happen by thinking or editing before becoming a commodity, since objects may also be reified by thinking about the object. In Marx it is the relationship between the exchange value and the use value.[20]It is too deterministic, as the notion of 'rationality' is too deterministic in the work of the Enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer criticized the dialectic of enlightenment as it blindly fostered such rational activities as the efficiency and management more prominent than emancipation.[21] In our efforts to alter the world for better rationality can play an enormous role if it doesn't exclude emotions. Ideas alongside senses and senses as an extension of ideas and ideas as the extension of senses is a project waiting for it's time to come. There is also the assertion that machines are extensions of senses. This aspect of understanding of technology as an extension of   senses also formed the basis of the philosophy of technology in the 19th century with Ernst Kapp as its founder. If technology is an extension of our senses then we need to find the point of connection between our senses and their extension. This kind of extension is like *derushage* in the process of editing. Derushage is an entrance to another phase, a transductive activity, which culminates in the decision making, rather than the solution. Mnemo-technologies play a crucial role in this transduction. The first assembly (derushage)   leads to decisions and engagement with the understanding of the interaction between senses and their projection as the technical reproducibility. This process is bringing the subjectivity of the experience back to its place and to make the thought as a prominent feature of becoming again. Taken from the experience of editing films that is one of the most striking examples of the use of technology in order to adjust the thought to a technique and the technique to a thought, the machinality with the creative, the technicality with the subjective and it is also what provides the chance to transgress the real.

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Transgressing the real takes place by editing and repetition.[22] The difference-the sense lost previously returns in the next step of the repetition, the repetition consists of the overabundance of the sense brought by the difference. Otherwise, our senses will be copied into the technological reality leaving humans empty from their insight. An example is the recent use of sensory technologies that makes senses diminish physically while increasing their use virtually and in a very spectacular way. Gestures are used while making a 'selfie' or chatting on the mobile etc. makes this spectacle increasingly visible that may have been considered as physiologically deranged before the use of communication technologies. In order to escape being dominated by technologies one thing should be remembered: any encounter with technologies is the chance to learn, to study. If we ignore this fact then the gap between subjects and technologies grows to the degree that becomes critical.

Recorded memory+ image+ the constitution of the subject=the constitution of cultural memory.

Gramamtization +imitari=image making.

I understand imitation in a way how Bernard Stiegler describes 'acting out' a phase-shift or as the shift in Roman Jakobson's sense[23].

Lacan and psychoanalysis limited the possibilities of subjects by limiting them to the social. It also limits the functioning of the language as a grammar. The shift from grammar to grammatisation (from the noun to adjective) and to grammatise also assumes de-grammatisation. Technicity provides the myriad possibilities to retain the other dimensions alongside the social: the philosophical, artistic etc. These different experiences are temporarily developed into pure experiences. Things in the world exist not because they have a logical order, but because of the personality who asks the question regarding this or another thing! Experience may be personal, like in one person's experience and it may also be scientific, like in a scientific

experiment: both of them are based not on the logic but the experience of questioning. Questions are projected towards things and then back to subjects as images. The trajectory of the projecting questions and their projection back to subjects is the time of the experiencing things which become memorized as images. It is also the time of the technique that precedes the thought! Philosophy starting after the emergence of Kant became concerned with diverting logic: the absence of the inference in phenomenology or study of the structure of the unconscious as a language. Does schematism work instead of the inference? The problem is trying to introduce a pure experience instead of the logic-Pure experience is the function, like in the slogan: The political is personal!

The image and its function

The image is a container of events of the time-three synthesis or triple synthesis-habit-memory-future. Habit is connective, memory is conjective and the future is disjunctive. Images provide two possibilities:

 a)   The image opens up the space of the worldly intelligence, which provides the movement of people and their ideas

b)   Understood as the 'time of the image 'images contain perspectives to move to a past and as well as to the future. Memory is a substance and attributes of memory are extended to images. An example of the virtual makes it more obvious: There is no virtual world (i.e. computing and programming and immersion of the user in the virtual) without memory-surfing on the internet is the encounter with images: here everything from the indexing to messaging is an image! Matter and thought are inseparable; they become separated through the repetition that creates memory. Memory poses questions towards things and then these questions are projected back again as images. This is also the formation of the technique. This precedes the thought. Memory is substance and

images are attributes of this substance. These attributes (images) create the actual (art, language), which is a constant restructuring of memory (images) and the virtual (media, internet) which cannot exist without memory, therefore it cannot exist outside images. Working on the internet is a constant encounter with images. In the world there areas many questions as many things. They are (questions) increasingly appearing as images, for instance, working on the internet is the encounter with images from indexing to messaging to more complex ones. Can image be understood as language: image-language? Or are they independent features of the thought: the thought of the image? What about the physical image? Three sets of images are questioned here:

Thought-image -   Language-image

                    Physical image-object image

The image is not pure, but a mixture of all three:

Language-image   -   technique

Thought   -   image

Image   -   mixture

Memory produces forgetting and remembering at the same time. It occurs before images come into existence. Remembering provides the possibility of being-in- touch with the substance while being motivated by difference and repetition. Forgetting on the other hand blocks memory and intensifies the activity of seeking for the other.

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Alterity occurs in both ways: by remembering and forgetting: remembering keeps moving away from the substance, whereas forgetting blocks the way to the substance. Images are coming into existence as the other. But this way of existence provides ambivalence towards the substance and instead the imitation to the technique of memory (forgetting or memorizing) motivates the individuation. Imitation is not copying, but reconstructing the other and constantly making a present of the other. The imitation is necessarily directed towards the alterity.

Art is an example of how perception of the world is the function of the world since art is a direct relation with images that are traces of things. In this sense art has always been conceptual. Artwork is an expression of the thingness of the world in concepts that are developed out of images. In art there are no pure images, since artists put their thoughts into images. In this process images refer to questions of memory and also to objects and images are conventional description of memory and the convenient way of referencing. This produces a temporal attitude, which may be called the revertible time, which may be expressed in gestures and mimicry.

Transpositional nominalism

It is important to distinguish between the stipulation of the thing and the thing itself. I use the term 'nominalism 'because all the movements, including realism or formalism, receive their legitimacy from being named. Naming is the beginning of knowledge: naming may move towards the infinity and create contradictions, on the other hand naming may lead to the unnameable.

Transposing provides knowledge. Two aspects of knowledge are important here:

A)   Experiential aspect (the encounter with the subject, intuition)

B)   Intellectual aspect (the information and analysis)

In this double- edged process art may be studied as a style and philosophy as a method and transposing the style with the method may define the technique of memory and the mode of thinking prior to other activities. Art is an instrument, the technique for the understanding of the world. Everything else resides in the history of art as a result of the use of this instrument. This history opens up the way to grasping the truth, but if the truth is impossible because it is covered by palimpsests, the access to the truth needs to overcome the impossible. This question creates the break, the break of 'tarrying with the negative' a space for thinking[24]. Art emerges in this space. Philosophy is constantly questioning the nature of things and the way of questioning provides new methods. Art provides an essence and philosophy provides the function, where art is a temporal object and philosophy is an indexical trace. They are inseparable.

Essence is in the function. When we write down '0' and pronounce 'zero' what is changing is their function but not the essence. In the first instance the function is writing, in the latter it is speaking (the essence is reinvented through repetition). That is why making lists is the way of comprehension of the infinity.

Transpositional nominalism can be simply described as the shift from the *"en tablo"* to the 'Mendeleev's periodic table' like mapping, projecting, sketching, schematising. There should be an articulation of natural sciences with humanities and art forms

art=thinking+making

with

technics= technique+technicity+technology .

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It is the way towards anew classification and an escape from the fetishism of separation created by the isolating nature of institutional thinking. It will also intensify the technique of spacing, which technically provides the chance of increasing the closer involvement with the spatial dimension of work, to feel it, to remember it, to become a master, before arriving at meaning, in other words, forgetting. This helps to enrich the subject, by absorbing the technique of spatial experiencing. If for the last three hundred years all modern sciences and art transformed humanity and pushed humanity to the boundaries, the transposition will help to create the condition of subjects' own making at these boundaries. By the way of defining the term 'transpositional nominalism' I would like to point two important features of this manifold and alterity oriented structure. It is a structure as far as it addresses machinality . Machinality must be grasped by subjects in order to enhance the confidence and to improve the technique of being. With the pressure of technologies on the one hand and the ideological implications on the other its crucial to remember : we are desiring machines! It motivates the potential becoming of subjects and stimulated by the thought and gives the way to individuation. In a way how Pythagoreans studied numbers according to the rhythm of the music, putting into the machine one's thinking may provide a form of individuation. In this way individuation which already is the combination of technics and thought, that is machinality , precedes matter and form and opens a field of difference prior to identity. Images versus identity and instead of pure identity there appear images that are "convoluted stories' '. Images are conceptual tools that combine words with images and continuously form and reform and de-form both thinking and making. Images are concepts but all concepts are problems and all problems are potential concepts.[25] These convoluted stories are inserted into spaces that are themselves manifold and become as such as the result of combination of the

technique and thought, they are made as spaces as the result of spacing or installing convoluted stories in them. It happens by locating, dislocating and trans-locating images (convoluted, multifarious as they are).

Locating   Dislocating

                        Translocating

Images are transcendental, they are , to put in crude terms , what forms a data available for thinking and making .Transcendental images play the role in this space as 'technics' to define the reality of existence of subjects. They are manifold or multiple from the very start. One is not- one but it is constantly multiplied because of the formation of concepts. However what we see at the end is one concept like in an example of *'migrasophia'*. It is one concept consisting of two words: migration and philosophy. In their turn migration as well as philosophy have very dense, tremendous multiple stories but with the power of combining a certain problem these two gigantic stories are seen as one in their combination. That is what is meant to say: One not- One. Transpositional nominalism is the combination of machinality (consisting of machine-machinality-machinery triad) with images (convoluted stories). In this way a transpositional nominalism provides the arena of productivity that makes the condition and the genesis of thinking and making as an instrument of the struggle to improve. Ideas emerge from the space of one but constantly appear as such;   however one is not one since it gives birth to a transcendence. One is the trance. To become knowledgeable, to become   intelligent means to decode the transcendent as "we are fantastically codable decoded agents".[26]

If technology is an extension of senses and with the proliferation of sensory technologies such as smart phones, iPods and so on it seems doubtless that is true, then there is a need to find the point of connection between our senses and

their extension. Instead of rejecting technology or falling prey to a technocracy there is a need to learn to use it correctly in order to escape a total domination of technologies over subject. Technics coupled with images and transposed provides one of the possibilities to escape this fate.

In the transpositional nominalism one (the condition of making) is not one (because this condition is coupled with the genesis) and a constant shift from the condition (techniques) to the genesis (mapping of convoluted stories or images). The condition of making is the condition of the genesis for further trans-individuation.

Transindiviuation, Cultural-simulation paradigm, Imitation and Hegemony

Each time produces its own cultural- simulation paradigm that affects every individual depending on their position. Each individual imitates to this paradigm trying to find the way to self-improvement, some consciously while others unconsciously. Cultural-simulation paradigm is similar to the notion of hegemony, but also very different from it.

Art produces no objects, ideology choses what is produced, philosophy neither produces or choses it recycles objects for its own reasons.

There is also information which plays the role similar to the *apeiron,* it is what is passed from one to another and this passing is registered by the image of thought. The image of thought is memory and it is also the time of the image a temporal condition of imaging. Imaging or making images is possible because any conceivable idea explaining the matter is connected to memory and programmed. To have an image of thought is possible by the virtue of consciousness and unconsciousness. Like we learn foreign languages as they are programmed beforehand and made available in manuals in the form of books or audio and video. The mother tongue is usually learned unconsciously. Apart

from that there is a degree of creativity, like literature which re-invents any language for its own use.

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Notes:

[1] Jean-Luc Nancy, *Hegel, The Restlessness of the Negative*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London, 2002, p. 5

[2] It is the reference to Husserl's use of the term 'a temporal object'.

[3] http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1642_3.pdf

[4] Algirdas Julien Greimas, *On Meaning.* trans. Frank Collins and Paul Perron. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987
Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, On the Line, Semiotext(e), NY, 1983. This small book is based on the extracts from a large volume entitled ' A Thousand Plateaus' that makes part of the two- volume "Capitalism and Schizophrenia'. [5]

[6] An allusion to Adorno's book, *The Jargon of Authenticity,* Northwestern University Press, 1973

[7] On the notion of practice and medicine see: Charles Singer, *A Short History of Science to the nineteen century,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1941

[8] Benedict Spinoza's "*Ethics"* is the reinvention of geometry for everyday existence; the same is true for Giordano Bruno. In general there are not limited examples that can be given from our times, yet the pedantic bureaucratic machinery of the culture industry represses this possibility.

[9] Pierre Gassendi in: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1642_3.pdf

[10] Rene Descartes, Meditations (1641) ,in Descartes: Selected Writings, Nelson's University Paperbacks, The Open University, 1970, pp.59-109

[11] http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1642_3.pdf

[12] Algirdas Julien Greimas, On *Meaning.* trans. Frank Collins and Paul Perron. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987

[13] Bernard Stiegler, Te*chnics and Time* published in three volumes: Volume, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1998, Volume, 2: Disorientation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, Volume 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 2010.

[14] Bernard Stiegler, Bernard Stiegler's Pharmacy: A Conversation," Configurations , 18 (3), 2010, pp. 459–76.

[15] Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. . *Anti-Œdipus.* Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane. London and New York: Continuum, 2004

[16] http://dephasage.ocular witness.com/pdf/Simondon Gilbert.On The Mode Of Existence.pdf

[17] Bernard Stegler, The Theather of Individuation: Phase-Shift and resolution in Simondon and Heidegger, Parrhesia, 7, 2009, p...51https://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia07/parrhesia07_stiegler.pdf

[18] Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press, 1970

[19] It is the reference to the "Speculative Realism" groups that claim that all the problems of philosophy are in the Kantian notion of 'correlationalism' and instead they insist that the thought can think itself.

[20] Karl Marx, *The Grundrisse,* Notebook VII, Machinery and living labour, 1858, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Grundrisse.pdf

[21] Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, Verso, 1997
The critique of knowledge by Foucault and Stiegler also has similarity with this point. In his definition of the Enlightenment Kant considers this movement as its capacity to foster the maturity that may provide a technique of self-consciousness.: http://www.allmendeberlin.de/What-is-Enlightenment.pdf

[22] Reality, like the irrational or surreal, existential and analytical or transcendental, is the method of understanding of the world, which is either material or ideal. For example when we say number 15 we are referring to the world consisting of the 15 numbers part of which is the number 15. Or when we paint a realistic painting of the Caspian Sea an artist refers to the sea which exists in a particular region etc.

[23] See Bernard Stiegler*, Acting Out*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009 and Roman Jakobson, "Shifters and Verbal Categories." *On Language* (ed. Linda R. Waugh and Monique Monville-Burston). 1990. 386-392

[24]Slavoy Zizek, *Tarrying with the Negative,*Duke University Press, 1993

[25] Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy, Columbia University Press, 1996

[26] Stuart Hall, OnPostmerdinsm and articulation, in Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in CulturalStudies(edited by Kuan-Hsing Chen, David Morley), Routledge,1996, p.137