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The Image of Time: Translating Imitations (transimitation) as the Invention of the Lost Time

> "In every respect, truth is a matter of production,
>
> not of adequation" (Deleuze 2004 b: 192)

Abstract:

Through the reading of Bernard Stiegler's notion of 'tertiary retentions' and Gebauer and Wulf's 'mimesis in time' I attempt to provide a new theory of the image which is based on the process of a conjugation of the missing dimension of time with the remnants of time, the conjugation made by the imitation and translation as the invention of time.

Keywords: artificial memory, the tertiary retention, the thematic complex, mimesis of time, transimitation, the personal repertoire (a conceptual persona)

Introduction

Memory is a productive force producing sensibilities, intelligibility, meanings, scenarios and objects. Memory itself, however, is the product of technics and any form of memory is impossible outside of the technology of recording. With the ascendancy of digital technology the image of memory or the 'natural memory' is superseded by its exposure value, to use the term from the cinema. The exposure value usually provides both the negative and the positive image at the same time, which opens up the possibility for selection. The possibility of selection through the double edged act of memory is a very condition of philosophy's choice of the intelligible imitation, having knowledge of its own imitation. With the increasing

automation of the work memory is exteriorised to the degree that memory, the container of time, is resided outside of the brain while separating subjects further from the exterior world.[1] It means that on the one hand there is an automatic imitation without awareness and on the other hand, there is a possibility of the conscious translation of what may be adopted from the process of automation. It creates mimesis and skesis at the same time (Mondzain 2004:83). Bernard Stiegler problematizes this ubiquitous event as" the pharmacy effect " (Stiegler 2013). A very complicated theory of the exosomotized memory by Stiegler insists on memory's being completely separated from the brain, since from the very start of hominization memory was recorded in technics (Stiegler 2020). In order to retain memory there should be a great attention.

 With the constant recycling of the recorded memory there is the proliferation of images, which is a part of the process of exteriorisation.[2] Any work of imitation is the articulation of the exteriorised memory, where the model of imitation is absent and may only be discovered by internalising what is exteriorised. It should also be said that the exteriority/ interiority process is resisting a total industrialisation of memory. The abeyance produced by the exteriorisation which necessarily results in industrialisation also produces (technical) objects, residues of memory which are not only having the exposure value for the unconscious imitation but also the reminiscence of the experience recuperated from the inheritance of the collective memory. This collective memory is stored in order to be passed to generations in technical objects from the earliest forms of writing to the most recent digital *emojis* and with digital technology as a new form of writing. Digital technology as a new form of writing is also what belongs to the order of automation, which mobilises all the technical objects for engineering which ends in the loss of any form of knowledge (Stiegler 2014: 191). This loss at the same time orients towards knowledge which is hidden in technical objects. The question is how to produce autonomy from heteronomy, from the loss and gain.

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Technical objects have historically assisted the cultural memory and in this sense the human is inseparable from technics and understood as a form of exteriorization. This exteriorisation creates a relation between the missing dimension of time and the remnants of time. Remnants of time are recorded in technical mnemonic devices in which the interiority of the human being is exteriorised into tools and other forms of 'organised inorganic matter'(Stiegler 1994), i.e. technics, where the human is technics. It is also how we experience time: as technics we imitate time of experiencing memory residing in technical devices. Following this I argue that in this situation, an imitation, which is an aleatory as well as an ephypholegenic act, should not be restricted to its functioning as a violence of representation. Instead it should also be understood as an act of capitulating of what is absent, the missing dimension of time and conjugating it with the remnants of time. Here imitation demands another technique, which is translation. Coupled with translation (from the Latin *translato,* carrying across) imitation as *imitari* (from the Latin image making), what I call translating imitation (transimitation), gives rise to the possible autonomy as a form of resistance to the process of automation.

I also argue for the use of the imitation as *imitari*, image making which is different from the unconscious imitation. I developed this notion of imitari from my reading of Roland Barthes's insistence of the use of the term imitation as it derives from its Latin roots as already mentioned above (Barthes 1977: 32). It makes it possible for me to analyse the act of 'image making' in its direct connection to life while seeing them in their difference. This difference is the condition of any understanding of living, making and theorizing. *Imitari* and life are directly related to each other in their difference, which is also the difference between the technical object and the noetic (thinking) object.

Imitari is a conscious act of rearticulating the exterior image in the interiority which remains as the aleatory act with the power of not only resembling but also dis-resembling. This provides the possibility for the internalization of the exteriorised memory to discover a

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certain autonomy .The exteriorized memory contains what is absent in the internal and this absence the possibility of internalisation. This condition is a mimetic condition (Gebauer and Wulf: 319) which demands good mimesis, the imitation which rescues humanity from the violence and stupidity. Imitation takes place when one doesn't know how to think of the exterior world and not knowing becomes the starting point of the new mimesis. Imitation is the first step to a thought which leads to translation,   to the second step which carries across the meaning discovered in the imitation while relocating it (meaning) from one place to another.   In this context, which is the context of the age of automation and the proliferation of hyper-technologies, *imitari*   is a conscious act of grasping time and as such producing temporal objects or objects of time. These objects become the basis for the discovery /invention of the lost time through translations to lead to the new thought. This is the possibility to regain the symbolic autonomy by personalising one's own repertoire as the resistance to automation. What I call transimitation is the process of building the personal repertoire articulated by the collective memory and at the same time the most effective way of becoming a part of this collective. Memory is always memory of the other and it is the virtue translated from the recorded memory which contains both the lost dimension of time and remnants of time. Transimitation   as the conjugation of the lost dimension of time with the remnants of time elaborates this virtue through the confrontation with the complexities brought by the persistence of the collective memory. Below I will demonstrate how this process takes place by reading Bernard Stiegler's notion of the' tertiary retentions' as 'derushage' which is the conjugation of the anamnesis with hypomnesis (Stiegler 2011). I will then introduce   the notion of what Gebauer and Wulf call the 'mimesis of time' (Gebauer and Wulf 1995:195). First some words of explanation on the notion of 'transimiation: constructing this term emerges from the necessity of the new model of image making. The new model of image making which is inseparable from the birth of the new

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subject or the conceptual persona is a necessary condition of the autonomy in the age of automation and hyper-mimesis. It will lead to the possibility of building –up the subject's (otherwise called *the conceptual persona*)   personalised repertoire through the access to the chaotically   proliferated images and the discovery/invention of the missing time. This missing dimension of time, which is both the lack of knowing how to think and the condition of the (re) cognition gained through the access to the historically disseminated knowledge. This knowledge is accessible in its hyper-chaotic form, yet exists as the 'toolbox' (Deleuze and Guattari: 1994) for the selection. This toolbox is the storage of memory recorded by different possible means of recording throughout history. The access to this toolbox opens up the possibility for conjugation. The conjugation is the technique which repairs the lack (the missing dimension of time) by bringing together imitation and translation, themselves are remnants of time. This conjugation is combining imitari with translation,   which includes not only the making of the image while adopting the exteriorised memory,   but also the choice and chance of translating it into one's own repertoire. It is also philosophy's engagement with its own virtual subject: the exteriority as the condition of internalisation. [3]

Transimitation is directed towards achieving the goal of building up one's own repertoire by internalising the exteriorised memory in the age of memory proliferation. The age of the proliferation of technologized images is at the same time the proliferation of models. The proliferation disorients people on the one hand and opens- up the possibility to imitate differently on the other. In the world of automation, on the one hand AI imitates the 'natural intellect', online communication imitates live communication and on the other hand the proliferation of technologized images produce the abeyance which increases the necessity of learning to imitate. Learning to imitate while translating the exteriorised image into one's own repertoire is the mimetic act of becoming the conceptual persona.

The conceptual persona is both the inventor and the operator of the conjugation of the missing dimension of time with the remnants of time. It is because the human is always in the default and in spite of this the human is always already in need of improvement through inventions. Despite the trendy notion of the 'trans-humanism', which denies the human as such, I argue that the prefix '*trans*' itself is the condition of translation rather than the closure. The possibility of translation resides in the constitution of the human's 'quasi-causality' (Stiegler 2020) and the non-representational notion of the discovery/invention as an on-going process. [4] A human never was the human and one becomes the woman/ man by receiving their image through the translation despite the default and the non-determinacy. It constitutes him/her not only as the tool maker, but also as an image maker. While making images out of images one enters into the fuzzy relationship with the exterior world. In this relationship the human is either pre-determined or over-determined and never determined, which enables the *semiurgy* as the condition of one's own making, not in order to represent only, but in order to enhance the actualization of 'how to live, to work and to think' (Stiegler 2020). *Semiurgy* is understood as the production of new meanings by the creation of new signs which expands and strengthens the role of memory.

Memory is the condition of possibility of knowledge and at the same time a territory created by that knowledge: one cannot be completely occupied or defined but only provisionally systemised in an open-ended way. Memory is inscribed in images, which imitates time and therefore images are indices of memory. The notion of time allows us to re-orient ourselves in the unexplored, fragmentary and elusive space brought into being by the proliferation of images and the condition of becoming. Thus, the subject of time should be understood as memory: both as a register of the past and projection of the future. To reconstruct the subject means to reconstruct memory. The subject here is the missing dimension of time in the situation when the proliferation of technologized memory accelerates the dispersal of images

and at the same time accelerates the loss of memory. The majority of 'debate' around 'artificial intelligence' is spurious above all because (on all sides) it ignores the meaning of 'artificial' which explicitly acknowledges human /memory/ temporality as originary and immanent to all subsequent 'automated' procedures (Azizov 2020: 39). In other words, once recorded, memory is always already artificial, or human and subjective. Intelligence without memory is impossible. Imitation takes an image from one time to another by the virtue of the recorded memory. The distance between the one (the missing dimension) and another (the dimension which is the remnant of the time) is never present .The distance is a temporal space for the discovery. *Imitari* translates into one's own repertoire what is recapitulated from the recorded memory which is a record of the distanced time.

The transimitation is the great option of art of memory, since the most of the population is absorbed by memory industry. It is crucial because the current changes in the world of images demands a new classification of images as there is a great confusion in making distinction between images of art and images of the culture industry. The cultural memory industry is what manipulates the population through the social media, news networks and the culture industry. The combination of *imitari* (making images out of other images) and the imitation game (memory restored in machines) defines a new direction of any kind of image making. The image making starts from the capitulation of the exteriorised memory. Memory is always outside, so the formation of thought takes place through the interrelation with the outside. Any form of thinking is coming to the grasp of the exterior. Thought as the result is always *extra*-ordinary, what comes from the pre-determinacy or the over-determinacy of memory historically exteriorized by technics starting with the writing and now with digitalisation as a new writing. Translating imitation is embracing this complexity.

 Mimesis is in general is 'the thematic complex' as pointed out by Gebauer and Wulf (Gebauer and Wulff 1995:309). Accepting this complexity is demanding 'the battle for the

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intelligence' (Stiegler 1994).   Learning is confronting complexity, a personal pedagogy; in the age of automation a culture of learning is the question of the digital proliferation. It is 'involuntary adventure, which links a sensibility, a memory and then a thought' (Deleuze 2004 a: 205). Learning is the image making (*imitari*) and intermediary between the world and the subject, the exterior and the interior and it is 'true transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, without mediating between them; and introduces time into thought' (Deleuze 2004 a: 207).

This introduction creates a suspension which became the stipulation for the translation. Time is extracted from memory which is an exteriorised image of time where something is 'gone missing' (Deleuze 2005: 207). The overabundance of sense produced during this exteriorisation creates the distance between different times is also the distance which opens up a space   for the conjugation of the discovery of the missing dimension of time with the left-overs or 'the remnants of time' (Blanchot 1989:256). Despite its having no sense as it is the non- sense, yet as the overabundance of the sense this distance is the possibility of the conjugation. In the distance the overabundance stabilizes the flux of meaningless signs where the new meaning may be discovered. In this flux what is real is imitational, what is imitational is real. But the real is also what is in flux and "flows cannot be represented. They can only be compiled or arranged" (Lazzarato 2008: p.285) . This arrangement takes place at the distance provided by the suspension, the abeyance where temporal objects of time are chaotically disseminated.

Derushage as tertiary retention and transimitation as the conjugation

Late capitalism exploits people's desire and controls people's spirit, which produces the malaise, or the pharmacological effect (Stiegler 2013). This effect increases the role in the pauperisation of culture on the one hand and the liberation of memory on the other. It is

because the recorded memory is the source of the data which became the basis of any work in the automated society and the individual engagement with memory. The pharmakon, defined as both cure and poison, refers to technical objects through which we open ourselves to new futures, and thereby create the spirit that makes us human. The technical object is inseparable from this understanding of 'the pharmacological effect' and should be understood as the tertiary retention. In Stiegler's definition the tertiary retention (the third memory) is the hidden condition of possibility of the play between what Husserl called primary retention and secondary retention (Stiegler 2011). The third memory is the technology which records memory and makes it accessible to us. The tertiary retention precedes our understanding of time and it is the condition of primary and secondary retentions.

The hidden condition is generated by the technical exteriorization of the vital movement on the basis of which André Leroi- Gourhan described hominization as a process of the conquest of space and time through its technicization (Stiegler 1994). There is a need to understand the human as a form of exteriorization, a relation between the living and the non-living in which the interior realm of the human being is exteriorised into tools and other forms of 'organised inorganic matter', i.e. technics (Stiegler 1994). Technics as the exteriorisation of the interior into tools is the condition of the *tertiary retention.* It is a new theory of understanding of the state of memory in the age of the proliferation of technologized images as traces of memory. In Husserl's theory the formation of memory is demonstrated by the example of listening to the melody on the gramophone. As already mentioned above, he specifies two retentions; the first retention is coming across the melody and the second retention is remembering what is heard before, that forms the' image-consciousness'. What Stiegler elaborates from the hidden condition or the third retention, is a technology itself that is a gramophone, as a tertiary memory: the gramophone qua tertiary memory originally highlights the fact of the selection of primary retentions by consciousness. The third retention

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is the technique or the recorded memory to which always possible to return, like it is possible to return to a gramophone in order to select and listen to the melody. The selection of the melody provides and intensifies the return to the primal impulse. In the age of digital proliferation it is the smartphone, to name but only one.

We can experience one temporal object many times thanks to the recorded memory. As we can experience a melody multiple times our experience of that melody also changes depending on how many times we experience it through the tertiary retention, which is the possibility of repetition of a temporal object. The secondary and tertiary forms of retention are the condition of the possibility of the primary retention. If there was no gramophone where we can listen to the melody, there would be no memory at all. Husserl's phenomenology is focused on showing the way in which the temporal distinctions of past, present and future are formed through retentions and protentions, Stiegler argues that we, as humans, from the day we are born, are defined by a tertiary memory that exists a priori: technics precedes human.

The technical, tertiary form of memory constitutes the trace from which we temporalize ourselves and the world around us. External to any internal consciousness the technical object also assists subjects to retain the lost memory. It is how the subject behaves while facing the technology: a temporal object (where the missing dimension of time resides) and consciousness (residual remnant of time) are intertwined. At this point of coinciding of temporal object with the consciousness something forgotten is remembered and retained.

 What is retained is the time of now and it is the conjecture of the coinciding as a new-time point and a new-object point. Retention as the grasping of this coincidence is the time of the image (the duration of the image being formed).In this sense retention is different from reproduction in the way of grasping the object of time. The reproduction is different from

the retention since reproduction produces representation whereas the retention is presenting of memory. However memory is present in both reproduction and retention. Reproduction makes memory immanent whereas retention opens-up the way towards the transcendental. Nevertheless the immanent and transcendental experiences are connected in a remarkable way by a change in the attitude since we can pass from one to other. In this process the third retention is not reductive but constitutive of the primary retention. This process as a trajectory of a new relation between the human and its milieu is how we, through technics, create time; we invent a future for ourselves that is dependent on the memory of the past and appropriated from the past for the present that will pass differently to the future .

Technics has become the external memory and the fragmentation of consciousness by temporality motivates the partiality and a temporal industrialisation of consciousness. Because memory now is 'a recorded memory', in other words, the past is stored in technics; any question of remembering and forgetting is resided within the 'technics'. As Stiegler puts it, "retention is always already protention":

One memorizes only by forgetting, by effacing, by selecting what deserves to be retained from all that could have been retained; in the same vein, one memorizes only by anticipating, positively or negatively, that which could have happened (which means that retention is always already protention) (Stiegler 2011: 64).

The "now" resides in between the retrieval of the past and the anticipation of the future. The present is objectified as the recorded memory and it is retrievable. The meaning is already separated from the subject, it is in the world and it precedes the present. The source of the meaning may be found outside in the exterior world; it may be retrieved from the exterior and passed to the future by technics. Any act of remembering creates a return to a primal impulse and as a result of returns and retrievals memory is disseminated elsewhere in history of culture. Following Derrida, Stiegler believes that any dissemination provides the way

towards the deconstruction of a primary impulse. The return to a primal impulse is a constant elaboration of the disseminated memory in repetition and difference. On the one hand the return intensifies the possibility of remembering. On the other hand it makes forgetting possible. In this way or another, relying on technologies for reasons of memory substitutes our own technique, a primary technique that comes before thought. This kind of formation is the 'montage-consciousness' and the contemporary consciousness is formed under the influence of technologies, like in the example of the melody. Listening to the melody is similar to watching a film or reading a book, which consists of temporal objects and produces a temporal 'montage-consciousness' (Stiegler 2011).

A temporal object exists as a transcendental reminder of the passing of the partiality that all forms of knowledge and technics are pointing to the difference. This difference provides the possibility for transcendence. Cinema, for example, precedes the viewer's thought and constitutes the 'time-consciousness' as the 'montage-consciousness'. Cinema is a realm of the cross-circulation of temporal objects. A critical awareness of the effects of 'cut-n-mix', of cutting and mixing of the *derushage* becomes a necessary condition of the constitution as experienced by temporal objects as far as they are thinkable.

The notion that with the proliferation there is a community of temporal objects that needs to be grasped in recollection. But because the consciousness is contaminated with the montage the structure of consciousness is thoroughly cinematographic and Stiegler asserts the impossibility of recollecting:

Recollection is impossible. The fact of memory is selection and forgetting and all remembering of a past temporal object there is a necessary process of derushage. Memory in all its forms would then always be a sort of rushing montage of frozen images (Stiegler 2011: p.27).

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The process of 'derushage' is a reorientation towards knowing, overcoming oneself in order to enter into a new relationship with the altered image of the self. Derushage (also called the first assembly) consists of images excluded during a montage which don't fit into the final composition. Instead of excluding these unwanted rushes, including them back in the composition displays new infinities in overcoming, although it is an extremely difficult process. Emerged from imitation derushage carries signs of 'mimesis' and 'skesis', miming and at the same time sketching further towards the unknown (Mondzain 2004:83). While including "the initial point", the point of intention as well as "the end point" , the point of termination, the imagined as well the experienced, the lived experience juxtaposed with a non-lived experience , montage connects what is disconnected and 'gone missing' (Deleuze 2005 :207).

The whole experience of memory is bringing forth this experience in order to externalise reminiscences. Scrutinizing the original source of this effect would require an active engagement with *the world as an edited version* (Goldman 1978). In this process images of memory become exteriorised,   while exhibiting the difference with the interior image. The procedure of construction, which is the montage, includes the excluded first assembly. This difference provides first meaningless images, because images of memory don't classify things and open for an arbitrary imitation, secondly they are waiting to obtain a new meaning and "waiting" for their time to come! At this point arbitrary images may become models for a further translation and for a new thought-image. It is possible because of their roughness and exclusion from the representation. A new thought-image is the image of the model not in the same way that an image is related to its model, but in a way of how the relation itself becomes an image, an image of the future. What comes to existence is what surpasses the content in derushage and deconstructs its content and provides a further possibility for translation. In this scenario a temporal object allows to bring together technics of derushage,

re-classifying them in a different manner. Technics play the role of the "beginning" of any formation that provides the possibility of the thought and therefore the human, which in turn produce new technics. We are technics that produce technics. In order to catch up with our technics we need to intensify our own technicity and to improve.

Derushage is opening up the space at the very limits of time and at the very point of the abeyance, while spatio-temporalsing the object of time. Derushage is another cinematic term, otherwise called 'the Kuleshov effect', which is adopted by Stiegelr to show how the default of the human is also the condition of the repairing the fault. Derushage as the technique is interesting for me here to consider a *transimitation* as the conjugation of the missing dimension of time with remnants of time. Joined together, technics and thinking are constantly discovering a mechanism to constitute the subject.

The constitution of the subject is taking place at the discovery of a mechanism (memory) and the invention of mechanism (derushage) is what brings together technics and thinking. It is the process of linking together technics and thought. Since the link between the technics and thought may be broken and joined again the mechanism is articulated in time and as such it is manifested in a temporal object. A temporal object provides a parallax view, which returns subjects to a starting point from another perspective. This return intensifies the process of becoming: on the one hand it de-personalises, de-individuates the subject at the very point of not being aware of what is happening. On the other hand it becomes the condition of becoming aware while opening the way for what I call *the personal repertoire*.

Transimitation as the image of time

Transimitation makes thought capable of profoundly disorganizing and reorganizing itself in order to interiorize the possibilities afforded by the artificial memorization. It is because, for instance, before the act of reading a text (just one example of the individuation by imitation)

there is acquisition of letters, assembling them together allows the acquisition of reading itself possible.

Like writing is carrying across the speech by literalizing it, reading carries across the same act of imitation where letters produce excess. The same is true of watching the film as well as working with digital technologies. In the distance provided by the excessive knowledge the technological (exteriorization) and the social (interiorization) and their conjugation as an autonomous act amounts to resisting the techno- logical automation. It is the way of escaping the domination which is imposed by the techno-logical turn of late capitalism.

Primary retention (the time of now) and secondary retention (the time passed) transformed into mechanical tertiary retentions. The tertiary retention became the condition of *imitari*, which cannot exclude the translation from its act of making. *Imitari* as it is constructed technologically and combined with translation overcomes the crisis. It is also the possibility of producing a new cultural model which may unite sensibility and intelligibility, the unconscious and the conscious.

Making images is the process processing (memorizing) which gives birth to a new 'member', a conceptual persona, who overcomes the task of remembering. Increasing technologizaiton of images and their use demonstrates how image making has always been the question of the technologization as in the act of reproduction as well as in the act of construction. Learning to write letters of the alphabet (one form of image making) is the first step to create complex forms of writing. Making an image is the conscious re-construction of time, which is disseminated in the records of memory, recorded in machines. However, to speak of images in this way became possible only in the age of technological proliferation, which is also a new perspective for the new mimesis.

The Korean video-artist Nam June Paik once observed in relation to new media art and time, that art doesn't imitate nature any longer, it imitates time and through this imitation the process becomes to substitute a natural perception (whatever it is!) which comes closer to reality with the flow of time. In this flow the translation plays the role of the interstitial passage as a space of transformation. This distorts meaning while converting it to a new circumscription of utterance. The flow of time moves across through retentions and technics, which automatically imitates the relationship between flows and desire to become and to individuate. This process produces two things: the industrial temporalisation of consciousness and new industrial temporal objects as a new model of thought. This also suspends the process itself because this is the point when a technologized image becomes the indirect image of time in its 'epochal double becoming' (Stiegler 2020: p.145). The epochal double becoming means that if any suspension (epoche) is also the possibility of making an epoch as an invention, which is not a passage from the imitation to translation, but a relation between two ways of making an image. It becomes the image of time in two ways: the first is the blind imitation whereas the second one is the maximal use of the selection by cutting and mixing. From the very beginning the montage was such an invention, which took place at the emergence of cinematic technology as the suspension of the 'a natural memory' and its translation into the recorded memory. The invention of the montage gave rise to a new epochal art, which is cinema. On the one hand this invention has replaced 'the real' for images, which made it possible to document any event by storing them in images and opened up the technological toxicity of events. But on the other hand there is a tremendous effort made by people of its time such as Sergei Eisenstein, for example, who rescued images from becoming just a banal technical repetition of events. It's re-invention by Eisenstein was due to his efforts to give to this new technology an aesthetic insight which turned the montage (read: transimitation) into the image of time and opened the way to countless filmmakers to

use his pattern for film making. Otherwise in its best cases cinema could have remained as a simple recorder of the chronology of events of the time. It took place by taking rough images (imitations) at the first assembly(derushage) seriously combined with the erudition and the intellectual power of the semiurgy of Eisenstein. His work was carried on by his students and friends among whom was Lev Kuleshov, whose name is associated with 'the Kuleshov effect', which I mentioned above. Our time is waiting for such a new semiurgic personality to bring to new media its artistic and political dimensions, which is so far missing. For the recorded memory, to put it in Socrates words about the technique of reading is 'a recipe not for memory but for reminder (hypomnesis). And it is no true wisdom but only its semblance' (Plato 1973: 275). Those who rely on reading for their knowledge will seem 'to know much, while for the most part they know nothing' (Plato 1973: 275). The recorded memory as a reminder opens up the space for the hope that limits and suspensions are not only impasses but also potential impossible possibilities

Mimesis of time: theatre of conceptualisation

Through their reference to Derrida Gebaur and Wulff demonstrate that reading as writing is imitation (Gebauer and Wulff 1995). It is the third retention, which becomes the condition of trans-individuation with one's own repertoire. One's own way of reading is also decision making. Decision making takes place in time and through time, time which is absent or late to its realization .Gebauer and Wulff touch upon this question through their analysis of Lessing's arbitrary reading of one of the most famous ancient sculptures, Laocoön . Lessing, differently from his contemporaries, poses the question of time and 'learns to regard, as his central categories, action and temporality' while treating mimesis as a methodical realization of signs in the form of images and an act of production (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: p.186).

Lessing takes into account imitation as an aleatory choice. This is called 'mimesis in time' by Gebaur and Wulff (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: p.186). This takes place through Lessing's reading of Laocoön, which is both spatialization and temporalization at the point of the suspension (Lessing 1836). The suspension which occurred within the static nature of the artwork at the same time opening-up for the discontinuous continuity through Lessing's reading, which imitates Laocoön's enclosed or hidden meaning while animating it through the mimesis. The reading at the limit of the knowledgeable and the sensible pulls the imitation back into being. This 'reading' is inserting of time into the 'solid' object of art through the temporal act of translating an already existing image. This is also a double edged relationship between *imitari* (image that is made and has 'ended' it's existence) and the translation, which carries across the time of something already finished, finalised and suspended, waiting for it's time to be taken further. In other words it is a process of taking the time of the image from one time to another. By doing so Lessing brings into the world of aesthetics what didn't exist before: the unprecedented question of temporality, which takes reading further to create a new image out of the existing image. This new image is also a symbolic world

Lessing conveys 'capabilities inherent in a system of signs to produce a symbolic world' (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: p.188). He understood that 'reading' as writing is imitation which connects the reader with the writer through the signs (technics) used to create a symbolic world which can also be translated into another, different symbolic world. The translation is capable of building- up one's own repertoire of looking at the world through the symbols created by another imitator. And it is not the individual case what interests Lessing, but how through his knowledge his repertoire should become the possible, a critically renewed repertoire for the next generation. It is the thoughtful question of taking care, what Stiegler calls *penser* (thought) and *panser* (care) occurs at once (Stiegler 2020). Because of this

Lessing questions limits of the artistic potential resided in 'a relation among the three elements, production-medium-reproduction' (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: p.188). The prefix '*re*' in the third element (reproduction) manifests the possibility of further imitation, tertiary retention. Potentially this possibility assumes both: the blind imitation and the act of poiesis. This is possible only insofar as it affects the potential of signs to create symbolic worlds. The potential is in the broken link between times of Laocoön and the encounter with the lost time. This distance opens up the room for making the space for looking at the static artwork through 'reading'. This process of reading is a temporal conjugation of the missing dimension of time with the remnants of time (potential of signs). This reading also imitates writing, which is 'organizing time' (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: p.192). While juxtaposing two different forms of organizing time through his 'reading 'of the artwork and through his writing of what is 'read', Lessing's work is done not by literally analysing the classical work based on the mythology, Pliny's description of Laocoön that is, but its presentation in different forms of art and literature, while making distinguishing between different spatio-temporalities in different forms, which is a sophisticated form of the derusahge:

Lessing transfers the principle of imitative production from the artist to those whose task is to understand the work; the latter also imitate, and what they imitate is the process of the artist's production" (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: p.190).

In this process the temporal (reading) is directed towards the spatial (artwork). Here the time based technique or the temporal, reading, is de-stabilising and temporalizing the spatial form of the art. Just like watching the film, reading temporalizes what is 'fixed' as recorded in the moving image; reading temporalizes the static form, the frozen image. To understand this *process* involves serious efforts and is a difficult task, of course, but it is also the chance and choice towards the production of new (industrial) models. The process is the mimesis of time

"the pursuit of life lived by other means than life" (Stiegler 1994), while it is the imitation of the past here and now, not for the nostalgic reason, but for the reason of constructing the present out of the past. Lessing formulated for his time his aesthetic philosophy from the bits and pieces of the ancient sculpture and literature, like a filmmaker who makes the montage to show the past in the present. This manner is very appropriate for our times of the proliferation of forms and ideas producing the hyper-chaos, which disorients on the one hand and works as an index of orienting on the other. This also means to put 'the concept of the action at the heart of mimesis, which suggests that our understanding of action must be differently organized' (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: p.195). A particular notion of time Lessing meant is 'personal time' (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: p.196), which is the meaning of his forced insistence on the concept of action.

Imitation is double-edged and on the example of reading is imitation of writing, like the writing is imitation of the speech. Written marks in themselves are meaningless, empty: they contain no sounds, no meanings, no time, but this meaninglessness is giving rise to encoding/decoding which produces meanings:

They must be decoded, which requires the use of a technology that was already employed in the encoding process, but now with significant differences: reading is not only a different process than writing, if only because, if done aloud, it activates the voice and the ear and acquires, as performance, a social character (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: 198).

In the process of becoming a social character any action is questioning the status of imitation. Because the text is written by the absent writer and read by the absent reader and the only connection is made by the imitation of the process of writing in the act of reading. Imitation discovers/invents the lost time of the writer and conjugates it with the remnants of time disseminated in the history of culture. The subject as the quasi-causality of the passing (by translating) what is received from the past to the future is a technological construct. It is a

technological construct as much as an alphabetic construct is word and memory. In the act of reading or reconstructing 'writing becomes a testimonial of the self and text registers a second temporal succession, namely, a succession in the time lived by the writer' (Gebauer and Wulff 1995: 203).

This technological construct is *the image of the time,* a personal time and a part and parcel of a mimetic construction of the world. While 'reading' Lessing consciously translated by carrying across the time which he discovered missing in reading of Laocoön by his contemporaries and invented a new image out of this image. As a conceptual persona Lessing accepted the mimetic condition of the 'the theme complex' and created the image of his time through the translation of imitation, rather than simply imitating. As a result his work made present what is absent as a phantom, which became the independent theory.

Conclusion

While translating different acts, which involves a triple act of *imitari, translation and thought*, the demand for further imitations arises. It provides an increasing possibility of the multiple personal repertoires (conceptual personas) as a form of resistance to the industrial populism in the age of the proliferation.

Imitation is a contingent act and formless form of thought, which is true of all times; it starts to make sense only after being translated into a new form. The model of imitation is tertiary retention, which opens up the possibility of the action to imitate and to translate. Translation is the stipulation which helps to escape the *imitari* itself to become a tautology, which forces a constant return to the contingent effect of imitation. This tautology is the destiny of humanity and became ever more prominent by the proliferation of technologies. If there was anything that stipulates something to come into existence due any event's contingency or necessity, I could possibly think of the absolute or relativity as they constitute the human.

Since there is nothing which precedes human existence apart from the 'recorded memory' in its contingency and where the human is the quasi-causality of any event, I believe that this contingency provides a wider *possibility* to construct the condition of one's own making by turning into his/her repertoire what is recorded. It acquires a careful 'reading' while conjugating the missing dimension of time with what remains of it. My own attempt is conjugating the missing dimension of time with the remnants of time where the conjugation is *a new autonomy resisting automation*. This new model of autonomy is *transimitation*. In this model images are not representations but distinguished in their readability which joins different times and subjects in the process of imitation cannot be reduced to any politics and as real as they are translated.

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Notes:

[1]Until recent times memory was considered as the most difficult notion for its scientific explanation. Based on ideas derived from fiction and theory, scientists managed to provide the scientific model of memory which exists outside the brain. For example, researchers from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology have created a device that acts like a synapse in the living brain, storing information and gradually forgetting it when not accessed for a long time. Known as a second-order memristor, the new device is based on hafnium oxide and offers prospects for designing analog neurocomputers imitating the way a biological brain learns. See:
https://mipt.ru/english/news/mipt_physicists_create_device_for_imitating_biological_memory
One may also think of memeplexes.

[2] I use the term 'images' for everything from writing to pictures as they are used by everyone in order to avoid restricting this term to artistic use only. I also refer to the cinematic images as examples from the history of art which can be used in order to make images out of existing images for the individuation. This understanding is close to Benjamin's notion of 'dialectical images' and his reading

by tracing the presence of the urban crowd in Baudelaire's' poetry as a 'hidden figure', through which images stage moments of shock. I use the term 'images' as everything from writing to pictures as they are used by everyone in order to avoid restricting this term to the artistic use only. I also refer to the cinematic images as examples from the.

[3] It is crucial to point out that the exteriority, the external world or 'the great outdoors' is one of the initial questions of philosophy that varies from one philosophical epoch to another and our times call for the return of the mimesis as the transient, contingent and neurotic act. It also makes the object-subject assumption as the critical force. It is crucial to point that the exteriority, the external world or 'the great outdoors' is one of the initial.

[4] Complicated notion of representation: in my understanding representation which is purely intertwined with the notion of 'meaning' creates an abeyance, the suspension of the meaning and in this way opens-up the way to new meanings, which in its turn provides difference and in this sense I think of non-representational imitation. I accept the following argument by Deleuze: 'Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates everything, but mobilizes and moves nothing' (Deleuze 2004 b).

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