

04.07.2019

The world as a system of pictures (EXTERIORISED OBJECTS) and a milieu for the existence of exteriorised objects, worldliness of images, separation of images from the world, technics, imitation as a condition of being in the world, limits, mimics, translating imitations (TRANS-IMITATION)

1. The world is understood by German idealism and partly by Fichte as ‘a system of pictures’ and accordingly the thought is taking into account this system and thinking is dialectical, in other words thinking is taking the object and the subject at the same time. With the proliferation of objects this vision of the world looks more materialistic than the materialist thought. The difference is that the ‘system’ itself is chaotic. In this ‘system’ of thought the point of departure is ‘the system of pictures’ which has no origin.¹ In this sense the image of thought is not directed towards origins or essences, which don’t exist, but to the point of departure, which opens up a space for the on-going imitations.

2. If the image of the world is without origins, then the imitation itself is a double act of discovering the object and the subject at the same time. Imitation is technics in the sense theorised by Bernard Stiegler and it is technics which precedes thought.²

3. Both, the system of pictures and the system of thought possess no identity in them, but are determined through what they are not like in the Greimas square.³ Identity as a temporal object arises from the repetition of difference or ritournelle, a little return, which makes a big difference and this difference, is temporal.⁴] Because this ‘ritournelle’ is a return to other returns is the reminder of a vanishing that points to its own future disappearance. This phenomena needs to be studied in the “world-wide historico-philosophical situation” in the teleological sense.⁵

4. The return escapes binarism and by doing so makes it possible as a dialectical image, what Stiegler calls ‘the pharmacological effect’.⁶ It is a materialist vision of our time, which is an ultimate triumph of idealism, which was severely criticised by materialism and it is also an ultimate reminder of necessity of dialectical-pharmacological thinking. Schelling: If the

dialectical principle (that is understanding, which divides but on this very account arranges and shapes things organically as well as the archetype towards which it is directed...⁷

5. I find this possibility in the 'system of pictures' as the point of departure, which consists of images. Images are temporal objects. I understand everything from the alphabetic writing to the latest digital images. Imitating these temporal objects opening up to the wider world and turning images into the worldly subjects. The place of thought is in this worldliness. The place of thought is ontological and constantly translating imitations. Any thinking is an ontological act rather than metaphysical speculation.

6. The reminder of images being separated from the world irreversibly also is the condition of images entering into the world and becoming worldlier makes the existence more incomplete. How incomplete the existence is? It is complete in its incompleteness, because the absence of precise origin provides the space for the fuzziness of objects and the encounter with objects temporarily connects subjects with the necessary temporality. Images are such objects and the encounter with images puts people in connection with the ungraspable world through imitation. For example, letters of the alphabet: as soon as they are written down they become worldly, in other words they become part of the world alongside people and other objects. This worldliness of letters carries further the preceding technique, which is the voice. After losing the direct connection with the voice the gap between the voice and the letter is created and in this between the contingent object emerges, which imitates what is lost after letters separation from the voice. This loss is manifested in the missing dimension, which is thought.

7. This missing dimension is elaborated in the montage and the montage is the technique that imitates thought and this imitation is constituted by the possibility of its erasure. Any imitation takes place where one doesn't know how to think and imitation elaborates the erased thought.

8. Exteriorised objects (images) are saturated by thought and any imitation is an internalisation of the external. The 'unconscious' act of imitation may not be aware of such saturation and a further translation (re-production) is needed in order to bring the imitation into a full consciousness. Translation is another technique following techniques of imitation to re-reproduce. Here the third technique, the techniques of decision making is crucial. The decision making is taking place in the fuzziness of the world of objects.

9. I call fuzzy objects, after Lotfi A Zadeh's 'fuzzy logic'.⁸ Fuzzy objects are problematized the question further for the age of technical reproducibility. In this irreducible reproducibility, 're-' is imitation and 'producibility' is a translation. An example of fuzzy logic in relation to a dialectical-pharmacological is the work of Kant: Critique of Pure reason. The reason Kant, who is overwhelmingly rationalising his signature demonstrates that there are at least two ways of saying things. That is why this magisterial work of philosophy exists in two versions as A and B versions. Contradiction over determines the binary logic of decision making.

In Lotfi A Zadeh's fuzzy logic the question of degrees of truth is a starting point. To speak of the 'fuzzy object' means that an object is in a situation of being grasped and any object is grasped in time; the complex ones take longer time and simpler objects take shorter time to be grasped. Lotfi A Zadeh has shown that depending on the degree of complexity the object provides more fuzziness. As a result, what seems to be precise loses meaning and what seems to be meaningful loses precision.

10. Technics are irreducible but reproducible. It is a process. Realism is not an objective imitation of life, but the insight that all reality whether within or without images is always artificially produced. The combination of the imitation (making images) and the 'imitation game' (memory restored in machines) leads to translation imitations. On a critical level trans-imitation is the polemic 'trans-human' not against humans, but against the ideological counterfeiting or imitating fraudulently.

Translation makes a shift from the place of imitation (topos) to 'autopos' placeless place, where aesthetic potentials of subjects reside. In trans-imitation, subjects imitate worldly objects that have lost their places and themselves become causes of "spacing" and naming. For Derrida, for example, naming and spacing, making a place are connected. Giving the name opens-up a new place like in Plato's *khora*.⁹ Even as it places and makes possible nothing less than the whole world, *khora* opens and dislocates, displaces all the categories that govern the production of that world, from naming to gender.¹⁰

¹ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *The Vocation of Man*, The Liberal Arts Press, 1956, p. 82

² Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, Stanford University press, 1998

³ Greimas quoted in Fredric Jameson, *The Prison House of Language*, Princeton paperbacks, 1975

⁴ Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 1987

⁵ Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970

⁶ Bernard Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, Open Humanities Press, 2018

⁷ F.W.J Schelling, *Philosophical Inquires into the Nature of Human Freedom*, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1989, p.97

⁸ I adopted the term ‘fuzzy objects’ from the work of Azerbaijani-American mathematician and computer scientist Lutfi A Zadeh’s concept of fuzzy logic for object oriented programming. He also contributed to set theory by creating ‘fuzzy sets’. Zadeh, A. Lutfi, *Computing With Word: Principal Concepts and Ideas* and Lutfi A Zadeh, *Toward a Theory of Fuzzy Systems*, University of California, Report for National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington D.C. September, 1969

⁹ Derrida J., *Khôra*, Paris: Galilée1993.

¹⁰ "The name: What does one call thus? What does one understand under the name of name? And what occurs when one gives a name? What does one give then? One does not offer a thing, one delivers nothing, and still something comes to be, which comes down to giving that which one does not have, as Plotinus said of the Good. What happens, above all, when it is necessary to sur-name, renaming where, precisely, the name comes to be found lacking? What makes the proper name into a sort of sur-name, pseudonym, or cryptonym at once singular and singularly untranslatable?" See: Derrida, *On the Name*, p.185